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PRIVATE ADJUDICATORS AND THE
PUBLIC INTEREST: THE EXPANDING
SCOPE OF INTERNATIONAL
ARBITRATION
William W. Park*
"And the King said, 'Bring me a sword.' So a sword was
brought before the King. And the King said, 'Divide the living
child in two, and give half to one and half to the other.'"
I Kings 3:24-25
INTRODUCTION

When Solomon arbitrated a child custody dispute, the baby
almost perished.' Today's arbitrator probably could not propose
such a drastic award. Yet courts may refuse to compel arbitration of some disputes for fear that societal interests may suffer a
fate similar to that which would have befallen the baby under
Solomon's initial judgment. The parties to the dispute are not
free to compromise rights other than their own.
Legal rules that affect private commercial transactions may
benefit the public as well as provide justice between disputing
parties. The businessman who brings an action for treble damages for injury due to a violation of the Sherman Act, designed
to preserve the free enterprise system, enforces the Act for the
benefit of all society. Courts have resisted giving effect to agreements to arbitrate disputes relating to such "core" public law
claims, of which antitrust actions are but one illustration, for
fear that private adjudicators may under-enforce laws designed
to protect all of society.2 These "non-arbitrable" laws are often
*
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1. The story does have a happy ending. The real mother's willingness to give up the
child rather than see it killed permitted Solomon to make an award of the entire infant.
2. The refusal to enforce the arbitration agreement often is based on an appeal to
the vague catchphrase "public policy," which overlaps, but is not necessarily co-extensive
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statutory, but they need not be so.'
To find public law claims "non-arbitrable" because of their
subject matter is only one approach to protecting the public interest in relation to arbitration of public law claims. Another approach would be to order the arbitration to go forward, reserving
to the court a "second look" at the arbitral process after the
award is rendered. This "second look" approach was taken in
Justice Blackmun's opinion for the majority in Mitsubishi Motors v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth,4 which held that American
courts must recognize an agreement to arbitrate antitrust claims,
at least when they are implicated in an international, rather
than domestic, transaction.
The decision in Mitsubishi provides a prism for separating
the various themes that inhere in arbitration affecting public
rights. The case supplies the occasion for examining whether the
needs of the international business community for a neutral dispute resolution mechanism require a special status for transnational commercial arbitration, either with or without a "second
look" at the award stage of the process.
This paper will suggest that in transnational commercial
matters the international business community's need for neutral
dispute resolution outweighs society's interest in supervising adjudication of public law claims. The traditional hesitation of
courts to compel arbitration of public law claims should yield to
a deeper concern that the refusal of American corporations to
honor agreements to arbitrate may impede effective neutral dispute resolution in transnational business relations.
with, the specific public policy defense to enforcement of foreign arbitral awards under
Article V(2)(b) of the 1958 New York Arbitration Convention. See infra notes 56-60.
3. "Statutory right" is a problematic label. In a civil law system, contract rights may
be statutory, and in a common law system "core public policies" may be embedded in
common law doctrines as important as those underpinning statutes. Whether the claim is
based on statute or common law is less significant than whether the enforcement of the
right directly protects the interests of non-contracting parties. Reference to "statutory
claims" may be shorthand for claims which cannot be abrogated consensually by the
parties. This begs the question of how claims whose resolution affects principally the
parties to the arbitration agreement are to be distinguished from claims whose settlement has a direct and important impact on the community at large, which includes persons not signatories to the arbitration agreement.
4. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 105 S. Ct. 3346, 87 L.
Ed. 2d 444 (1985).
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OF AUTOMOBILES AND ANTITRUST

An apparently routine termination of an automobile distributorship arrangement led the United States Supreme Court, on
July 2, 1985, to hold that agreements to arbitrate antitrust issues should be enforced in the context of an international transaction. Soler-Chrysler Plymouth (Soler), an auto dealer, had entered into two contracts relating to the distributorship
arrangement. One contained a clause providing that disputes
arising between the dealer and the manufacturer would be settled by arbitration in Japan. When Soler could not meet minimum sales commitments in its territory, metropolitan San Juan,
Mitsubishi Motors, the manufacturer, brought an action in the
Federal District Court for the District of Puerto Rico 5 to compel
arbitration. Mitsubishi claimed to have suffered damages in
storing vehicles never delivered. Soler counterclaimed with allegations of injury due to Mitsubishi's participation in a conspiracy to divide markets and to restrain trade, in violation of §1 of
the Sherman Act.6
The background of the case was a joint venture between
Chrysler Motors (Chrysler) and Mitsubishi Heavy Industries to
produce cars that would be marketed through Chrysler's distribution network. Chrysler dealers outside the continental United
States were to distribute vehicles manufactured by a Japanese
company, Mitsubishi Motors, owned jointly by Chrysler, through
its Swiss subsidiary Chrysler International S.A., and Mitsubishi
Heavy Industries.
Soler entered into two contracts: (1) a "Distributorship
Agreement," signed in October 1979, with Chrysler's Swiss subsidiary, and (2) a tripartite "Sales Agreement," binding not only
Soler and Chrysler, but also Mitsubishi Motors, which covered
the actual sale of the vehicles by the manufacturer.
The Sales Agreement contained a peculiar arbitration
clause, which covered only disputes between Soler and Mitsubishi Motors, and only if arising under five of the contract's fifteen articles:
All disputes, controversies or differences which may arise between [Mitsubishi] and [Soler] out of or in relation to Articles
I-B through V of [the Sales Agreement] or for breach thereof,
5. The action was brought under Sections 4 and 201 of the Federal Arbitration Act.
9 U.S.C. §§ 4, 201 (1982).
6. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1980).
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shall be finally settled by arbitration in Japan in accordance
with the rules and regulations of the Japan Commercial Arbitration Association.
After Soler ordered the vehicles, business declined in San
Juan. Soler asked to transship the vehicles to other markets in
North, Central and South America, but Mitsubishi Motors refused to permit the transshipment, purportedly out of concern
for the vehicles' suitability in areas outside Puerto Rico, where
heaters might be needed or where unleaded high octane fuel
could not be obtained. After Soler disclaimed the order, Mitsubishi Motors filed a claim to compel arbitration, to obtain a declaration that the distributorship was terminated, and to receive
what the contract called "distress unit penalties," which were
liquidated damages to reimburse storage costs and interest for
the 966 vehicles ordered but not shipped. These claims, as well
as Soler's Sherman Act counter-claims alleging a conspiracy to
divide markets, were referred to arbitration by the district court.
Thereafter, the arbitration was interrupted when the First
Circuit held that the antitrust counterclaims could not be referred to arbitration because of the vital public interest in preserving free market competition through proper enforcement of
antitrust laws. The First Circuit very neatly set up a single issue
for appeal, rejecting arguments made by Soler based on (1) the
scope of the arbitration agreement, the terms of which were
found wide enough to cover statutory claims arising under the
Sherman Act; (2) a Puerto Rican "unfair competition" statute,
rendering null and void arbitration agreements in dealership
contracts; and (3) the Federal "Automobile Dealers' Day in
Court Act." Arbitration was found inappropriate only as to
Sherman Act claims, and the district court was directed to consider how parallel judicial and arbitral proceedings should go
forward.
The First Circuit followed the doctrine announced in 1968
by the Second Circuit in American Safety Equipment v. J.P.
McGuire,7 which found antitrust claims to be more than private
7. American Safety Equipment v. J.P. McGuire, 391 F.2d 821 (2d Cir. 1968). In addition to concern for the protection of the public interest in proper enforcement of the
Sherman Act, id. at 826, the American Safety decision also articulated other reasons
why antitrust claims should not be arbitrable: (1) that the contract may be a "contract of
adhesion," id. at 827; (2) that antitrust issues are prone to complication requiring a sophisticated legal and economic analysis that is "ill adapted to... the arbitral process...
," id.; and (3) that the arbitral tribunal would be composed of representatives of the
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matters. Antitrust laws are enforced in large measure by private
litigants whose claims for treble damages protect the public interest by posing a deterrent to potential violators. The core of
non-arbitrability argument is that the public - which never
signed the arbitration agreement - is hurt directly when a law
of fundamental importance to democratic capitalism is improperly enforced. The unstated assumption is that arbitrators will
be less likely than courts to interpret the law correctly, to find
liability or to award treble damages. Thus, as the argument goes,
just as war is too important to be left to generals, public law
issues are too important to be decided by arbitrators.
The First Circuit had to reconcile its view of law and policy
with the 1958 New York Arbitration Convention, 8 which requires recognition of arbitration agreements falling within its
scope as long as they "concern a subject matter capable of settlement by arbitration."" To fit the non-arbitrability doctrine
into the framework of the New York Convention, the First Circuit linked Article II, relating to enforcement of the arbitration
agreement, with Article V, relating to recognition of the award.
Language in Article V - "under the laws of [the enforcement]
country" - permits refusal of recognition of an award if the
subject matter of the difference is not capable of settlement by
arbitration under the law of that country where enforcement is
sought. This language was read into Article II which mandates
enforcement of agreements concerning a subject matter "capable
of settlement by arbitration." 10
business community hostile to the constraints of antitrust law, id.
8. Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards of
June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2518, T.I.A.S. No. 6997, 330 U.N.T.S. 38 [hereinafter cited as
New York Convention]. United States implementing legislation Pub. L. 91-368, 84 Stat.
692, 9 U.S.C. §§ 201-08 (1982). On the New York Convention, see generally A.J. VAN DEN
BERG, THE NEW YORK ARBITRATION CONVENTION OF 1958 (1981); W. CRAIG, W. PARK, & J.
PAULSSON,

INTERNATIONAL

CHAMBER OF COMMERCE ARBITRATION

pt. 6, ch. 37 (1981),

[hereinafter cited as I.C.C. ARBITRATION]; Aksen, American Arbitration Accession Arrives
in the Age of Aquarius: United States Implements United Nations Convention on the
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 3 Sw. L. REV. 1 (1971); McMahon, Implementation of the United Nations Convention on Foreign Arbitral Awards
in the United States, 2 J. MAR. L. & CoM. 735 (1971); Quigley, Accession by the United
States to the United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 70 YALE L.J. 1049 (1961); and Von Mehren, The Enforcement of
Arbitral Awards under Conventions and United States Law, 9 YALE J. WORLD PUB. ORD.
343 (1983).
9. New York Convention, supra note 8, at art. II. See generally A.J. VAN DEN BERG,
supra note 8, at 56-57 (on the scope of Article II).
10. There are, of course, alternative interpretations of Article II of the New York
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The Supreme Court reversed the First Circuit judgment on
the issue of the antitrust counter claims, holding these claims to
be arbitrable in the international case at bar, even if a contrary
result would be reached in a domestic context. The case was remanded to the Court of Appeals, which on remand affirmed the
judgment of the district court that had ordered Soler to submit
its antitrust claims to arbitration.
In reversing the First Circuit, the Supreme Court did not
deal with the New York Convention. Rather, it denied the presumption that arbitrators would not apply the Sherman Act.
Justice Blackmun wrote, "[a]nd so long as the prospective litigant effectively may vindicate its statutory cause of action in the
arbitral forum, the statute will continue to serve both its remedial and deterrent function."11
In September 1984, Soler filed a petition for reorganization
under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code, which provides for
an automatic stay of all actions including arbitration against the
bankrupt. 1 2 The parties returned to court in Puerto Rico to litiConvention. The phrase "capable of settlement by arbitration" might refer not to the
local law of the enforcement forum, but to international public policy, prohibiting, for
example, arbitration of contracts to sell narcotics or to engage in "white slavery." Or, the
words might refer to the policy of the proper substantive law expressly chosen by the
parties or designated under appropriate conflict of law principles to govern interpretation of the contract.
11. 105 S.Ct. 3359-60 (1985). In light of this reasoning, it is puzzling that Blackmun
limited his decision to international contracts. His assumption that arbitrators as well as
judges can enforce public laws would seem to apply equally to domestic arbitration. The
distinction between domestic and international arbitration would have made more sense
in a decision based on the New York Convention.
Whether or not anti-trust issues are arbitrable in a domestic context remains an
open question. See Michael Genna v. Lady Foot Int'l, Inc., No. 85-4372, slip. op. (E.D.
Pa. Jan. 24, 1986) (stay of litigation pending arbitration of anti-trust claims in a domestic shoe store franchise; finding that the Mitsubishi reasoning is more compelling in a
domestic context where the arbitrators "have the benefit of the American spirit of free
competition"). See also Shamir v. Kidder Peabody, 84 Civ. 8179 (CBM) (S.D.N.Y. Mar.
12, 1986) which suggested that the Supreme Court in Mitsubishi held that Sherman Act
claims were arbitrable even in a domestic context. Cf. Stendig Int'l v. B & B Italia S.p.a.,
633 F. Supp. 27 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
On other issues, judicial enthusiasm for the arbitral process seems to have been
stimulated by Mitsubishi. Judge Weinfeld, in Development Bank of the Philippines v.
Chemtex Fibers, Inc., 617 F. Supp. 55 (S.D.N.Y. 1985), issued an order compelling arbitration of civil RICO claims. (Philippine bank guaranteed loans by American corporation
to Philippine corporation - claim of fraud by American lender, allegedly violating Racketeer Influenced & Corrupt Organizations Act.) In Graphic Communications Union v.
Chicago Tribune, 779 F.2d 13 (7th Cir. 1985), Judge Posner was bold enough to say that
in the future he may impose fines on persons who make weak applications for stays of
arbitration.
12. 11 U.S.C. § 362 (1978).
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gate whether the Bankruptcy Code prevails over the Arbitration
Act. On April 14, 1986 the United States District Court for the
District of Puerto Rico removed the reference to the Bankruptcy
Court, and ordered arbitration to resume forthwith. 13
II.

SUBJECT

MATTER

ARBITRABILITY:

AND PRIORITIZING POLICIES

CHARACTERIZING

CLAIMS

4

Beyond the cheers of Mitsubishi by arbitration connoisseurs
and the bewailing of the case by antitrust enforcers 15 lie the interests of a larger society. One approach to the task of distinguishing between those interests and claims that are negotiable,
and those that are not, is the establishment of a hierarchy of
values as suggested in this section.
A.

Taxonomy: Non-Negotiable Public Law Claims

All laws implicate public interests, in the sense that they
further societal goals, such as ensuring respect for contracts or
the orderly inheritance of property. Yet some laws appear to
bear upon public interests to a greater degree than others.
Private parties may negotiate away some rights by an arbitration clause or choice of law clause - even before any dispute
arises's - and courts will enforce this bargain. The right to de13. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., No. 85-838, slip. op.
(D.P.R. Apr. 14, 1986).
14. For a survey of public policy issues related to arbitrability, see Sterk, Enforceability of Agreements to Arbitrate: An Examination of the Public Policy Defense, 2
CARDOZO L. REv. 481 (1981). See generally Allison, Arbitration Agreements and AntiTrust Claims: The Need for Enhanced Accommodation of Conflicting Public Policies,
64 N.C.L. REv. 219 (1986); Goodman, Arbitrability and Antitrust, 23 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 655 (1985); and Roth, Application of the Convention on the Recognition and
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 8 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 194 (1985) (for a survey
of the issues specifically related to antitrust).
15. See Becker, Anti-trust and International Arbitration -The New American
Synthesis, INT'L Bus. LAW. 445, 447 (1985).
16. A distinction between "pre-dispute" and "post-dispute" arbitration agreements
is made in many jurisdictions. For example, in England pre-dispute agreements to exclude judicial review of arbitral awards are still void as to shipping, insurance, and commodities contracts governed by English law. Court review of disputes in these areas was
considered a fruitful catalyst for development of English law, long pre-eminent in maritime, insurance and commodities matters. Prohibition of pre-dispute exclusion agreements in these areas was intended to encourage fertilization of English law by the commercial community through judicially reviewable arbitration. Exclusion of appeal in
these "special category" disputes is possible only after the disputes actually arise. See
Park, Judicial Supervision of TransnationalCommercial Arbitration: The English Arbitration Act of 1979, 21 HARv. INTr'L L.J. 87, 91 (1980) (pre-1979 law).
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mand payment for goods sold and delivered might, for example,
be bargained away. As to other rights, however, courts hesitate
to permit a waiver, before the dispute arises, of rights that implicate what might be referred to as "non-negotiable" public interests. Indeed, the vindication of some claims involves widespread effects, external to the parties, which are so significant
that adjudication becomes a matter of public concern.
Disputes arising under competition law represent but one of
several types of claims as to which courts have refused to compel
arbitration, pursuant to an otherwise enforceable pre-dispute
agreement to arbitrate. 17 With respect to commercial disputes,18
American courts, at one time or another, have found at least a
half dozen other areas of federal law to be "non-arbitrable" because of subject matter,19 including (1) the 1933 Securities Act,2°
22
(2) patents, 2' (3) ERISA claims at termination of employment,
(4) civil claims under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act,23 (5) bankruptcy matters as to which there is an
17. When a party to a dispute involving non-arbitrable subject matter refuses to
honor his, her or its commitment to arbitrate, courts have permitted different claims
arising out of the same facts to be decided by parallel proceedings: arbitration for the
arbitrable subject matter issues, and litigation in court for the non-arbitrable subject
matter issues.
18. Non-commercial disputes may also be non-arbitrable, for example when they
implicate civil rights or employment discrimination, or family law and child custody.
19. On subject matter arbitrability, see generally Hoellering, Arbitrability of Disputes, 41 Bus. LAW. 125 (1985); and I.C.C. ARBITRATION, supra note 8, at § 5.07.
Concerns related to public international law may also constitute a bar to effective
arbitration. Article V(2)(a) of the New York Convention, it will be remembered, permits
refusal of recognition and enforcement of an arbitral award if the subject matter of the
difference is "not capable of settlement by arbitration." See supra note 10. This defense
was invoked successfully in proceedings to enforce an award resulting from nationalization of an American oil concession by Libya. In Liamco v. Libya, 482 F. Supp. 1175
(D.D.C. 1980), the D.C. District Court refused to enforce an award in favor of the despoiled American enterprise because of the act of state doctrine, which precludes American courts from considering the validity of an act of a foreign sovereign.
The Liamco decision is questionable. The court was asked to enforce an award, not
to pass on the validity of the foreign nationalization or the compensation therefore. The
decision, vacated because of settlement between the parties, was effectively ignored six
months later in the same district. In American International Group v. Iran, 493 F. Supp.
522 (D.D.C. 1980), the court enforced an arbitral award in favor of insurance companies
whose business in Iran had been nationalized.
20. Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953).
21. See cases cited in Davis, Patent Arbitration:A Modest Proposal, 10 ARB. J. 35
(1955). In 1982 Congress amended the patent statute to permit arbitration of validity
and infringement suits. See 35 U.S.C. § 294 (1952).
22. See Amaro v. Continental Can, 724 F.2d 747 (9th Cir. 1984).
23. See McMahon v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 618 F. Supp. 384 (1985); but
see contra Ross v. Mathis, No. 84-1309, slip op. (D. Ga. Sept. 11, 1985).
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automatic stay of all actions, 2 4 (6) the Commodities Exchange
Act,2 5 and (7) the Civil Rights Act.26
Certain areas of state law have also been non-arbitrable, including claims under franchise law,27 not implicating interstate
commerce and thus pre-empted by the Federal Arbitration
29
Act,28 and claims for punitive damages.
The goal of these "non-negotiable" legal rules is not merely
justice between the parties. They also create benefits for all of
society - such as a fair stock market or an orderly way to deal
with bankruptcies. For this reason, courts consider that these
rules implicate what might be called "public rights."
The first refrain that appears in arguments against arbitrability of public disputes is that public dispute resolution will
fertilize judicial precedent. The development of the legal system,
it may be argued, requires implementation and interpretation of
statutes by courts that create precedents open for all to see.
However, this argument seems to put the cart before the horse.
Public interpretation of statutes does create precedent that may
guide businessmen. However, courts elaborate the law to deal
with disputes; they do not entertain litigation in order to permit
lawyers to elaborate the law.
The second and more central theme that runs through the
non-arbitrability cases is a concern that society at large will be
injured by arbitration of public law claims. Courts express this
fear in a variety of ways. They may say that the legal and factual issues are too complicated for arbitrators; that arbitration
proceedings are too informal, providing inadequate discovery;
that arbitrators, like foxes guarding the chicken coop, have a
pro-business bias and will under-enforce laws designed to protect the public; that arbitrators are less connected to the demo24. See Zimmermann v. Continental Airlines, 712 F.2d 55 (3d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 52 U.S.L.W. 3509 (Jan. 1984); Braniff Airways, Inc. v. United Airlines, Inc. 33 B.R.
33 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1983).
25. See Marchese v. Shearson Haydon, 734 F.2d 414 (9th Cir. 1984).
26. See Alexander v. Gardner-Denver, 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
27. See California Investment Franchise Law, CAL. CORP. CODE, § 31,512 (1970).
28. Recently, it has been held that the Federal Arbitration Act prevails over the
California Investment Franchise Law, supra note 27. See Southland Corp. v. Keating,
465 U.S. 1 (1984) (involving California franchise of Texas-based owner of "SevenEleven" stores, holding that issues arising under State Investment Franchise Law were
arbitrable).
29. Jones, Punitive Damages in Arbitration in the U.S.A., 14 IN'L Bus. LAW. 188
(1986); Stipanowich, Punitive Damages in Arbitration: Garity v. Lyle Stuart Revisited,
66 B.U.L. REV. 953 (1986).
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cratic process than judges; that lack of appeal to arbitral awards
makes arbitration a "black hole" to which rights are sent and
never heard from again.
No empirical evidence suggests that arbitrators are necessarily any less trustworthy or competent than judges. There may,
however, be merit in holding "public law issues" non-arbitrable
under a slightly different alternative analysis, which starts with
a recognition that arbitrators are paid only to do justice between
or among the parties before them. "Public rights" belong not to
the litigants, but to society at large. Society never signed the
arbitration agreement, and is not a party to the arbitration. If
the arbitration, which is a consensual process, affects only the
consenting adults who signed the agreement, they alone are hurt
by the arbitrators' folly. But if the dispute affects the property
of one who never signed the arbitration agreement, the arbitration takes on a different cast. Indeed, the right to proper enforcement of antitrust laws may be analogous to a third person's
property right. Furthermore, the societal interest in the vindication of claims relating to matters such as free economic competition and the securities markets belongs not to the businessmen
in the controversy, but to a community which never agreed to
arbitrate.
The dozen years before the Mitsubishi decision saw a chipping away of the judicial resistance to arbitration of public law
claims. From one perspective, the Mitsubishi case is merely an
extension of the doctrine announced in previous cases. Specifically, prior to Mitsubishi, the Supreme Court held in Sherk v.
Alberto Culver"0 that in an international contract securities law
issues were arbitrable, notwithstanding their non-arbitrability in
a domestic setting. Sherk's special rule for cross-border transactions, justified as necessary to avoid damaging the "fabric of international commerce and trade,""1 was a logical extension of
the Court's opinion in Bremen v. Zapata,3 2 which had been decided two years previously. In Bremen, the Court gave effect to a
pre-dispute choice of forum clause that selected the High Court
of London to decide a controversy between a German company
30. 417 U.S. 506 (1974) (contract for sale of European corporations by a German
citizen to an American company"pursuant to a contract signed in Austria, closed in Switzerland and providing for I.C.C. arbitration in Paris).
31. Id. at 517.
32. 407 U.S. 1 (1972) (towage of oil rig from Gulf of Mexico to Adriatic Sea).
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and an American company.33
Moreover, in 1984 the Supreme Court ruled that when interstate commerce is involved, prohibitions on arbitration under
state franchise laws are invalid,3 4 pre-empted by the Federal Arbitration Act,35 as are prohibitions on arbitration of state securities law claims." The trend toward greater arbitrability of subject matter is also manifest in legislative measures. Congress has
removed barriers to arbitration of disputes involving the validity
and infringement of patents, although the decisions are not
37
binding on third parties.
B. A Hierarchy of Policies
The Mitsubishi case skeletonizes various rival policies, each
sound and worthy of recognition by itself, yet conflicting with
each other in their application. These competing themes require
a hierarchical ordering so that their application to a particular
controverted event may be determined. In viewing these policies,
one might articulate three competing objectives: (1) freedom of
33. See infra text accompanying note 131 (on forum selection clauses that designate
third country courts).
34. Southland v. Keating, 104 S. Ct. 852 (1984).
35. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-10, 201-08 (1982).
36. Dean Witter Reynolds v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 105 S. Ct. 1238, 84 L. Ed. 2d 158
(1985) (investor suit of brokerage firm because securities declined in value). In a footnote
the Court suggested that claims under the 1934 Exchange Act, as opposed to the 1933
Securities Act, should be arbitrable. 105 S. Ct. at 1240 n.1.
The circuits are divided on the question of whether securities fraud claims under
Rule 10(b)-5 (1934 Securities Exchange Act) are arbitrable pursuant to customer-broker
arbitration agreements. The Eighth Circuit has held that arbitration may be compelled.
Phillips v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 795 F.2d 1393 (8th Cir. 1986). The
Ninth Circuit, among others, adopts the view that customer claims arising from the broker's alleged violation of the 1934 Act are not arbitrable. Conover v. Dean Witter Reynolds Inc., 794 F.2d 520 (9th Cir. 1986). See also McMahon v. Shearson American Express, 788 F.2d 94 (2d Cir. 1986).
37. 35 U.S.C. § 294 (1952). Voluntary Arbitration
(a) A contract involving a patent or any right under a patent may contain
a provision requiring arbitration of any dispute relating to patent validity or
infringement arising under the contract. In the absence of such a provision, the
parties to an existing patent validity or infringement dispute may agree in
writing to settle such dispute by arbitration. Any such provision or agreement
shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, except for any grounds that exist at
law or in equity for revocation of a contract.
(c) An award by an arbitrator shall be final and binding between the parties to the arbitration but shall have no force or effect on any other person.
Id. (added Pub. L. 97-247, § 17(b)(1), Aug. 27, 1982, 96 Stat. 322).
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contract to provide for private dispute resolution, which calls for
an efficient arbitral process; (2) protection of society against
under-enforcement of law by private adjudicators; and (3) meeting the needs of international trade and investment for a system
of neutral non-national binding dispute resolution.
Underlying the first objective is the assumption that the enforcement of a freely accepted bargain to arbitrate - entered
into by parties with equal negotiating power - will provide the
business community with the benefits of confidential, economical and speedy dispute resolution. A different result might be
reached in the case of "contracts of adhesion" imposed on
weaker parties with little bargaining power. It may have been so
in the Mitsubishi relationship with Soler, though the First Circuit based its refusal to compel arbitration on nonarbitrability of
subject matter, not on the "adhesive" nature of the contract.
The second goal, protecting the public against under-enforcement of mandatory public norms, relates to a concern of
many judges that arbitrators will be less likely than courts to
apply our competition law correctly, or at least less likely to find
liability and to assess treble damages. Incorrect application of
the law may hurt those segments of society that have a stake in
the outcome of the arbitration.
The final objective - meeting the needs of international
commercial and investment transactions - presumes that business people will be more likely to enter into trans-border contracts, resulting in more efficient allocation of global resources, if
they feel confident that potential disputes will be settled in a
forum more neutral than the other party's national courts.
While trans-border business will continue even if assertion of
public law claims can defeat the arbitration agreement, it would
seem reasonable to expect that many wealth-creating transactions might fail if business people lack confidence that they can
avoid the "home town justice" of the other party's national
courts.
I.

THE "SECOND LOOK" DOCTRINE

The competing interests that must be balanced when one
party to a dispute resists enforcement of the agreement to arbitrate are also implicated when the arbitrator's award is
presented for recognition or enforcement.
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Blackmun's Dicta

Most people probably feel more comfortable in forgoing an
opportunity to express themselves if they believe that at some
future time they will have another opportunity to speak their
minds - if they foresee a "second chance" to make their statement. Therefore, it is not surprising that the end of the majority
opinion in Mitsubishi contains three sentences of dicta predicting that American courts will have a second bite at the arbitration apple when the time comes to enforce the award. 8 Arbitration of public law issues should be more palatable, which is to
say less threatening to societal interests, if there is opportunity
for judicial review after the arbitration.
This prediction of a "second look" - the "first look" having
been when the court examined the parties' agreement to arbitrate for the purpose of deciding whether to compel arbitration rests on a provision of the 1958 New York Arbitration Convention that explicitly reserves, to courts asked to enforce an arbitrator's award, discretion to refuse recognition or enforcement
when this would be contrary to that forum's public policy.39
This vision of how the world will be on the evil day of reckoning, when the award is presented for enforcement, calls first
for the observation that the award may never be presented for
enforcement in the United States. For example, if Soler loses,
and some of its assets are located outside of the United States,
Mitsubishi could seek attachment of these assets in the foreign
country where the assets have their situs. 4 0 The foreign court
may not concern itself with the United States' "Magna Carta of
free enterprise."' 41 Indeed, the Sherman Act may even appear to
the foreign court as a parochial American rule that runs counter
to its own national competition law or policy.
38. 105 S. Ct. at 3360. The dicta reads in part as follows:
the national courts of the United States will have the opportunity at the award
enforcement stage to ensure that the legitimate interest in the enforcement of
antitrust laws has been addressed... [and] to ascertain that the [arbitral]
tribunal took cognizance of the anti-trust claims and actually decided them.
Id.
39. See infra note 56 for text of this provision.
40. For example, Soler might have a claim against a foreign debtor such as a South
American purchaser of vehicles. The claim (an asset for Soler) would be located - and
attachable - where the debt had its situs, which under most choice of law rules would
be at the debtor's residence.
41. See 105 S.Ct. at 3367 (Steven's dissent, quoting U.S. v. Topco, 405 U.S. 596, 610
(1972)).
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In such an eventuality, the loser of the arbitration would
have to test the award by bringing a post-arbitration antitrust
claim before American courts, in the hope that the award, when
presented as a defense, would be denied res judicata effect. This
would not, of course, prevent the award from being recognized
as a defense to enforcement in non-American jurisdictions where
the losing party has assets.
Whether the "second look" means that recognition of an
award may be refused merely because the arbitrator misapplies
the law remains uncertain. Such a broad interpretation -of the
"second look" may open the door to a judicial review of the substantive legal merits of an arbitrated dispute, doing little for the
advancement of the arbitral process.
If, however, the "second look" doctrine contemplates a more
limited judicial role, simply a mechanical examination of the
face of the award to see whether the arbitrator mentioned the
Sherman Act at all, one may wonder whether the "second look"
will provide an effective mechanism for judicial control. An arbitrator might mention the Sherman Act and then refuse to apply
it without giving any reasons.
The "second look" doctrine is a problematic safety valve for
ensuring that public law issues receive proper consideration. If it
calls for review on the merits, it disrupts the arbitral process.
But if it calls only for a mechanical examination of the face of
the award, it may not provide an effective check on an arbitrator
who mentions the Sherman Act before he proceeds to ignore it.
This uncertainty has led one commentator to refer to the
"second look" doctrine as "so much Micawberism," alluding to
the optimistic ne'er-do-well in Dickens' David Copperfield
who
'4 2
was always waiting cheerfully "for something to turn up.

B. Fitting the "Second Look" Into the Structure of the 1958
New York Arbitration Convention
The manner in which the "second look" doctrine evolves,
through judicial elaboration, will have a significant impact on
the vitality of the 1958 New York Arbitration Convention,43
which provides the basic treaty framework for enforcing foreign
arbitral awards. At last count, the New York Convention had
42. Becker, Anti-trust and InternationalArbitration thesis, INT'L Bus. LAW. 445, 447 (1985)..
43. New York Convention, supra note 8.
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been ratified by seventy countries including the United States,4
the Soviet Union, most Western industrialized countries,4 5 and
many developing nations.4 6
The Convention requires recognition of the parties' agreement to arbitrate, and recognition of the arbitrator's award. This
double barrelled assault on uncertainty in dispute resolution was
intended to give parties to international contracts some hope
that they may avoid the "home town justice" they fear will be
meted out in foreign courts. This concern may seem less significant to Americans if the alternative to United States courts is an
English language proceeding before a judge in London or Toronto, than if the alternative to arbitration is a proceeding in
Arabic or Farsi before a judge in Tripoli or Teheran. 7
The starting point for fitting the "second look" doctrine
into the Convention framework is Article III, which provides,
"[e]ach Contracting State shall recognize arbitral awards as
binding and enforce them in accordance with the rules of procedure of the territory where the award is relied upon ......
In its field of application, the Convention generally follows a
territorial approach, looking to the locality of the arbitral proceedings, and covering awards rendered in a country other than
the country where enforcement is sought. 8 The parties to the
dispute need not be nationals of contracting states. 49 At least
one case has held the Convention applicable to awards rendered
44. United States implementing legislation, Pub. L. 91-368, 84 Stat. 692, 9 U.S.C. §§
201-08 (1982).
45. Canada, previously one of the most notable abstainers among industrialized
countries, recently acceded to the Convention on 12 May 1986, to take effect on 10 August 1986. On the background to the Commercial Arbitration Act and the U.N. Foreign
Arbitral Awards Convention Act, see LaLonde, Buchanan, & Ross, Domestic and International Arbitration in Quebec, 45 REVUE DU BARREAU 705 (1985).
46. Other arbitration treaties include: Protocol on Arbitration Clauses, signed at Geneva, Sept. 23, 1923, 27 L.N.T.S. 158; Convention on the Execution of Foreign Arbitration Awards, signed at Geneva, Sept. 26, 1927, 92 L.N.T.S. 301; European Convention on
International Arbitration (Geneva 1961), infra note 49; Panama Convention of 1975, "Inter American Convention on International Commercial Arbitration" (1956). See IC.C.
ARBrrRATION,

supra note 8, at 37.01-37.05; DOMKE

ON COMMERCIAL ARBrrRTmION

at §

45.03 (G. Wilner ed. 1986).
47. Another alternative might be the national courts of a third country. See infra
text accompanying note 131.
48. Article I(1). The scope of the Convention as to arbitration agreements is less
clear than its scope as to awards. See VAN DEN BERG, supra note 8, at 56-57.
49. Compare European Convention on International Commercial Arbitration, Apr.
21, 1961, 484 U.N.T.S. 349 [hereinafter cited as Geneva Convention of 1961].
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by the United States-Iran Claims Tribunal in The Hague.50
The Convention's scope also extends to awards "not considered as domestic," which one American case has interpreted to
include an award rendered in a dispute between foreign parties,
relating to a commercial transaction occurring outside the
51
United States.
The United States has taken two reservations to the Convention, permitted by Article 1(3) of the Convention itself. First,
the United States applies the Convention only to awards rendered in the territory of another contracting state. This geographical reciprocity refers to the place where the award is rendered, and has nothing to do with the parties' nationalities.
Second, the United States applies the Convention only to "commercial" disputes as defined under United States law.
The United States does not apply the Convention to awards
or agreements arising out of legal relationships entirely between
American citizens, which for a company means incorporated or
having principal place of business in the United States, unless
the underlying transaction involves foreign-situs property or
performance of the contract abroad. 52 If the Convention does apply, then United States courts must recognize and enforce the
award. The party seeking enforcement must furnish an authenticated original or certified copy of the agreement and the award.
The court can refuse recognition and enforcement only on
the basis of one of the defenses enumerated in Article V of the
Convention." The litany of defenses begins with five procedural
50. Mark Dalla v. Bank Mellat (July 26, 1985), reported in Iranian Assets Litigation
Reporter (Sept. 27, 1985) (Judge Hobhouse). See generally Audit, Le Tribunal des Dilfrends Irano-Americains (1981-1984), 112 J. DE DROIT INT'L 791 (1985); Lanke & Dana,

JudicialReview of Awards of the Iran-UnitedStates Claims Tribunal: Are the Tribunal's Awards Dutch?, 16 L. & POL. INT'L Bus. 755 (1984); and Stewart, The Iran-United
States Claims Tribunal: A Review of Developments 1983-84, 16 L. & POL. INT'L Bus. 677
(1984) (on the operation of the U.S.-Iran Claims Tribunal).

51. Bergesen v. Joseph Muller Corp., 548 F. Supp. 650 (S.D.N.Y. 1982), aff'd, 710
F.2d 928 (2d Cir. 1983) (charter party between Norwegian ship owner and Swiss com-

pany transporting chemicals between the United States, Europe and the Caribbean.
Award in favor of shipowner Bergesen. Enforcement unsuccessful in Switzerland.
Bergesen petitions for "confirmation" of award in New York under the United States
Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 207 (1982)).
52. 9 U.S.C. § 202 (1982). See Fuller v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 421 F.

Supp. 938 (W.D. Pa. 1976) (in which the court compelled arbitration of contract with a
"reasonable relationship" to a foreign country).

53. The text of Article V of the New York Convention of 1958 reads as follows:
1. Recognition and enforcement of the award may be refused, at the request
of the party against whom it is invoked, only if that party furnishes to the
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defects: (1) lack of a valid arbitration agreement; (2) denial of
opportunity to be heard; (3) an excess of jurisdiction by an arbitrator in deciding matters beyond the scope of the arbitration54
submission; (4) procedure contrary to the parties' agreement;
and (5) annulment of the award in the country where rendered.
The last of these procedure-related defenses might become
significant in the Mitsubishi saga if Soler wins the arbitration,
but, due to Japanese public policy or some other factor, the
award is annulled by a court in Japan, the place of the proceedings. An award annulled in Japan but presented for enforcement
in a country where the losing party has assets could be refused
recognition because it was set aside in "the country where
made."

55

competent authority where the recognition and enforcement is sought,
proof that:
(a) The parties to the agreement referred to in article II were, under
the law applicable to them, under some incapacity, or the said
agreement is not valid under the law to which the parties have subjected it or, failing any indication thereon, under the law of the
country where the award was made; or
(b) The party against whom the award is invoked was not given proper
notice of the appointment of the arbitrator or of the arbitration
proceedings or was otherwise unable to present his case; or
(c) The award deals with a difference not contemplated by or not falling within the terms of the submission to arbitration, or it contains
decisions on matters beyond the scope of the submission to arbitration, provided that, if the decisions on matters submitted to arbitration can be separated from those not so submitted, that part of
the award which contains decisions on matters submitted to arbitration may be recognized and enforced; or
(d) The composition of the arbitral authority or the arbitral procedure
was not in accordance with the agreement of the parties, or, failing
such agreement, was not in accordance with the law of the country
where the arbitration took place; or
(e) The award has not yet become binding on the parties, or has been
set aside or suspended by a competent authority of the country in
which, or under the law of which, that award was made.
New York Convention, supra note 8, at art. V.
54. Thus, Article V(1)(d) attaches important legal significance to procedural rules of
arbitral institutions (such as the I.C.C., I.C.S.I.D., or the AAA) chosen to supervise the
arbitration. See Fertilizer Corp. of India v. I.D.I. Management, 530 F. Supp. 542 (S.D.
Ohio 1982). See also Maritime International Nominees Establishment v. Guinea, 693
F.2d 1094 (1982) (AAA arbitration of a dispute arising from a contract calling for
I.C.S.I.D. procedure) and its Swiss sequel (Geneva cantonal Cour de Justice (86 Chambre) - No. 2514 on 13 Mar. 1986).
55. More will be said later on the influence of the national law of the country where
the award is rendered. At this juncture, however, it should be noted that the English text
of the New York Convention's language is not mandatory. Enforcement "may be refused," but need not be. The French text, however, differs: "La reconnaissance et
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These five procedural defects must be asserted and proven
by the resisting party. They permit the court to avoid becoming
an instrument of unrighteousness by lending its power to the enforcement of an award that resulted from a fraudulent, unfair,
or basically unjust arbitration. They are not intended to permit
judicial review of the merits of the dispute.
There are two additional defenses against recognition of an
arbitral award that a court may raise on its own motion, without
any proof by the party resisting the award: that the subject matter is not arbitrable, and that enforcement would violate the forum's public policy. While all Convention defenses generally relate to public policy in some way, the final defense refers
explicitly to the forum's public policy. 56
At first blush, the explicit public policy "catch-all" defense
seems to provide a graceful exit from awkward enforcement obligations. 57 However, the "second look" doctrine may not marry
well with the New York Convention, at least if the doctrine is
interpreted to permit inquiry into the legal merits of an arbitrated dispute. Merits review runs counter to the American judicial tradition that awards should not be refused enforcement
merely because the judge differs with the arbitrator's legal analysis. During the quarter century since the Supreme Court decisions in the Steelworkers Trilogy cases, 58 courts effectively have
l'ex~cution de la sentence ne seront refuses... qui si ....
." ("Recognition and enforcement will not be refused ...

unless....")

56. Article V(2) of the New York Convention reads as follows:
Recognition and enforcement of an arbitral award may also be refused if the
competent authority in the country where recognition and enforcement is
sought finds that:
(a) The subject matter of the difference is not capable of settlement by
arbitration under the law of that country; or
(b) The recognition or enforcement of the award would be contrary to
the public policy of that country.
New York Convention, supra note 8, at art. V(2).
57. The first Article V(2) defense - lack of arbitrability of subject matter - would
not have been available in Mitsubishi, because Blackmun found antitrust claims arbitrable. It was, however, invoked in Libyan American Oil Co. v. Socialist People's Libyan
Arab Jamahirya, 482 F. Supp. 1175 (D.D.C. 1980), which was later vacated because of a
settlement between the parties. The Court held that the subject matter of the arbitration
- nationalization of LIAMCO's oil concession by Libya - was non-arbitrable because it
involved an "act of state," the validity of which American courts would not examine. See
supra note 19.
58. See United Steelworkers of America v. Am. Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960);
United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960);
United Steelworkers of America v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp. 363 U.S. 593 (1960).
For a recent articulation of the principle of arbitral economy, see Sun Ship v. Matson,
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been precluded from reviewing the merits of an arbitrated
dispute.
United States courts generally have interpreted the public
policy defense as applicable only to a breach of what the Second
Circuit has called our "most basic notions of morality and justice." 9 American cases have construed the public policy defense
narrowly in order to avoid disrupting the international dispute
resolution process. The explicit Convention public policy defense would seem narrower than the non-Convention public policy defense courts may apply in domestic cases.60
Non-American cases likewise restrict the scope of the public
policy defense, distinguishing between domestic public policy,
ordre public interne, and international public policy, ordre public international. The demands of the latter are fewer than
those of the former. The adjectives "domestic" and "international" apply not to the source of the policy but rather to their
field of application.6 ' Both are creatures of the forum's national
legal system. For example, an award without reasons might vio785 F.2d 59, 62 (3rd Cir. 1986), in which the district court's refusal to vacate an arbitral
award was upheld, its review power being limited to determining "whether the parties
had a fair and honest hearing on a matter within the arbitrator's authority." Id.
59. Parsons & Whittemore Overseas Co., Inc. v. Societe Generale (RAKTA), 508
F.2d 969, 974 (2d Cir. 1974).
60. The Southern District of Ohio held that an arbitrator's lack of independence
from one of the parties does not constitute a violation of public policy. See Fertilizer
Corp. of India v. I.D.I. Mgmt., Inc., 530 F. Supp. 542 (S.D. Ohio 1982). The Second
Circuit has rejected a public policy defense based on a break in diplomatic relations
between the United States and Egypt, where the contract was to be performed. See Parsons & Whittemore Overseas Co., Inc. v. Societe Generale (RAKTA), 508 F.2d 969, 974
(2d Cir. 1974). The Southern District of New York has suggested that duress in the
formation of a contract might constitute a violation of public policy, see Transmarine
Seaways Corp, of Monrovia v. Marc Rich & Co., 480 F. Supp. 352 (S.D.N.Y. 1979), aft'd,
614 F.2d 1291 (2d Cir. 1979) (duress not proven in the particular case), but that participation in the Arab boycott of Israel would not give rise to a public policy defense, see
Antco Shipping Co. Ltd. v. Sidermar S.P.A., 417 F. Supp. 207 (S.D.N.Y. 1976). Misleading the arbitral tribunal has been found not to justify the public policy defense, although
dicta in the same case says that active fraud, such as perjury, might cause enforcement
of the arbitral award to violate public policy. See Biotronik v. Medford Medical Instrument Co., 415 F. Supp. 133 (D.N.J. 1976).
In only one published case, to my knowledge, has an award been even partially refused recognition under the public policy defense of the New York Convention's Article
V(2)(b). See Laminoirs-Trefileries-Cableries de Lens, S.A. v. Southwire Co., 484 F. Supp.
1063 (N.D. Ga. 1980) (involving what the court deemed a penal provision of French law
calling for penalties for late payment of goods).
61. See H. BATIFFOL & P. LAGARDE, I. DRoiT INTERNATIONAL PRIVA §§ 366-67, at 459
(6th ed. 1974).
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late French or Swiss public policy in a domestic contexts2 but
not in an international context.6 3
The dearth of American cases on public policy leaves much
to speculation and surmise. One might suggest a tripartite classification of cases in which the public policy defense would be appropriate with respect to: (i) arbitrations involving transactions
tainted in their substance, such as contracts for sale of drugs or
for sale of military equipment to enemies; (ii) arbitrations to enforce contracts entered into under duress; or (iii) arbitrations in
which the arbitrator is corrupt.
The contours of these categories cannot be drawn with precision. But they can be drawn narrowly. To construe the public
policy broadly would seriously undermine the goal of arbitral
process, which is to avoid extensive court proceedings. As the
Supreme Court has recognized, "the efficacy of the arbitral process requires that substantive review at the award-enforcement
stage remain minimal. ...
C. Elaboratingthe "Second Look" Doctrine
Whether the "second look" doctrine is compatible with the
New York Convention depends on what it means "to ascertain
that the [arbitral] tribunal took cognizance of the anti-trust
claims and actually decided them."6 5 If a review on the legal
merits is called for,66 the "second look" doctrine may conflict
with the New York Convention's objective of permitting parties
to cross-border contracts to provide that their disputes will not
end up in foreign courts. In the alternative, the words used by
Blackmun in Mitsubishi may call for merely a mechanical inspection of the face of the award, which may not pose an obsta62. See Art. 1471(2) of the French Noveau Code de Procedure Civile (N.C.P.C.),
Decree No. 81-500, May 12, 1981 Recuil Dalloz-Sirey, Legislation [D.S.L.] 237, 1981 Bulletin Legislatif Dalloz [B.L.D.] 237; Art. 33(e) of the Concordat Suisse sur L'Arbitrage,
reprintedin III INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION pt. VII, doc. VII.J.1 (1986).
63. Art. 1495 of the French N.C.P.C. permits parties to an international arbitration
to waive this requirement. On Swiss law, see Provenda S.A. v. Alimenta, S.A., 12 Dec.
1975, Swiss Federal Supreme Court, Arrats du Tribunal Fgdgral Suisse 101 la 521, in
which it was held that an unreasoned English award could be enforced in Switzerland.
Commentary thereon in DUTOIT, KNOEPFLER, LAIvE & MERCIER, I RFPERTOIRZ DE DROIT
345, at 319 (1982).
INTERNATIONAL SUISSE
64. Mitsubishi, 105 S. Ct. at 3360.
65. Id.
66. For example, to determine whether the arbitrator understood and properly applied the Sherman Act as it effects trans-shipment of vehicles.
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cle to a savvy arbitrator who mentions the Sherman Act before
rendering an award that misapplies the Act. Under either interpretation, the "second look" doctrine would not prevent a de
facto denial of an antitrust claim due to a lack of adequate discovery that impeded the proof of plaintiff's claim.
Under either interpretation, a written opinion by the arbitrators setting forth reasons - or "motivation," in European
parlance - for the award would seem necessary. In many countries, including the United States, there may be a practice that
the award announces only the result; and reasoned awards may
be discouraged because they give the disgruntled loser a peg on
which to hang a challenge to the award. The American Arbitration Association (AAA) President cautions that written reasoned
awards are "dangerous because they identify targets for the los'67
ing party to attack.
If, on the other hand, an award is rendered without a reasoned opinion, it is uncertain how the "second look" doctrine
would apply. It would not be a simple task to conduct an inquiry
of the face of an award with no explicit reasons.
In short, if the "second look" calls for a merits review, the
arbitral process will be harmed. If a merits review is not called
for the doctrine may not have much impact.
D.

The Arbitrator'sDouble Bind

An intriguing aspect of the "second look" doctrine is the
possibility of a challenge to an award that did take cognizance of
United States antitrust claims. If the contract includes a choice
of law clause explicitly selecting the law of a non-market economy with no antitrust law, the arbitrator mindful of Blackmun's
dicta in Mitsubishi may nevertheless decide the antitrust claims
according to United States antitrust law. This departure from
the parties' choice of law might open the door to a challenge of
the arbitral award, particularly if enforcement is sought outside
the United States, under Article V(1)(c) of the New York Convention, which prohibits arbitrators from deciding matters not
submitted to them, i.e., Sherman Act claims. Therefore, the arbitrator may be in a double bind, forced to navigate between
67. R. COULSON, BUSINESS ARBITRATION: WHAT You NEED TO KNOW 25 (2d ed. 1982).
Compare Professor Carbonneau's view of reasoned awards, in Carbonneau, Rendering
Arbitral Awards with Reasons: The Elaboration of a Common Law of International
Transactions,23 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 579 (1985).
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Scylla and Charybdis. Refusal to consider anti-trust claims
might open the door to review on a "second look;" but consideration of antitrust claims might constitute an excess of authority.
An award that ignores the parties' express choice of law
might also be subject to annulment at the place where rendered.
The Supreme Court in 1953 opened the door to annulment for
what it called "manifest disregard" for the law, 68 a concept sufficiently broad to catch the arbitrator who applies a law other
than the one selected by the parties. Analogous provisions exist
70
9
in the laws of the European arbitral centers of London, Paris
and Geneva. 7 ' The loser in an arbitration in which the Sherman
Act was applied notwithstanding the parties' choice of a governing law, other than that of the United States, could be expected to seek annulment of the award where rendered. Annulment would make the award potentially unenforceable under the
provisions of the New York Convention Article V(1)(e), which
permits refusal of recognition to awards set aside in the country
where made.
The arbitrator's bind is particularly poignant because no articulable test distinguishes, in a coherent and intellectually satisfying way, arbitrator error that constitutes excess of authority
from error that is not reviewable. Perhaps, as Lord Denning has
written, "whenever a tribunal goes wrong in law, it goes outside
68. Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 436, 74 S. Ct. 182, 187 (1953). See infra text accompanying notes 104-05.
On manifest disregarding of the law, see Kurt Orban Co. v. Angeles Metals Sys., 573
F.2d 739, 740 (2d Cir. 1978); Drayer v. Krasner, 572 F.2d 348, 352 (2d Cir. 1978); I/S
Stavborg v. National Metal Converters, Inc., 500 F.2d 424, 430 (2d Cir. 1974); Parsons &
Whittemore Overseas Co. v. Societe Gen. De L'Indus. Du Papier (RAKATA), 508 F.2d
969, 977 (2d Cir. 1974); Saxis S.S. Co. v. Multifacs Int'l Traders, Inc., 375 F.2d 577, 582
(2d Cir. 1967); San Martine Co. de Navegacion v. Saguenay Terminals, Ltd. 293 F.2d
796, 801 (9th Cir. 1961); Sidarma Societa Italiana di Armamento Spa, Venice v. Holt
Marine Indus., Inc., 515 F. Supp. 1302, 1305-06 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), all'd, 681 F.2d 802 (2d
Cir. 1981).
See also the recent case Sea Dragon, Inc. v. Gebr. Van Weelde Scheepvaartkantoor,
574 F. Supp. 367 (S.D.N.Y. 1983), concerning a charter contract between a Dutch charterer and a Panamenian ship owner. In an award to the owner, the arbitrator ignored a
Dutch sequestration. Id. at 369. The court implied that review for "manifest disregard of
the law" was implicit in section 10(d) of the U.S. Arbitration Act, since an award that
disregards the law exceeds the authority of the arbitrators. The court vacated the award
because of the disregard of the Dutch order. Id. at 373.
69. See infra text accompanying notes 106-113. The existence of a valid "exclusion
agreement" would of course raise the issue of whether the disregard of the chosen law
constituted "misconduct."
70. See infra text accompanying notes 114-15.
71. See infra text accompanying note 119.
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the jurisdiction conferred upon it.... -72 Yet, to find all arbitral
errors reviewable would defeat the goal of arbitration - to stay
out of court.
Lack of an intellectually satisfactory standard to distinguish
different types of arbitrator error need not prevent courts from
attempting the distinction."3 Although there is no bright line
test to prevent indirect review of the merits of the dispute
through the vehicle of judicial scrutiny of arbitrator excess of
authority, courts nevertheless have made, and must continue to
make, some attempt at determining matters of degree. 4
Ultimately, courts must walk an intellectually disquieting
tightrope. On the one hand, review must be limited so as not to
frustrate the purpose of the parties when they signed the agreement, though not when it later went sour for one of them, which
was to avoid litigation. On the other hand, courts should deal
with situations where there is a fundamental discord between
how the arbitrator decided the dispute and how the arbitrator
had been authorized by the parties to decide it.7 5 Therefore the
arbitrator may face a dilemma when the parties choose to subject their contract to a foreign legal system with a competition
law different from that of the United States. Does the arbitrator
apply the foreign law and make the award subject to attack
under Blackmun's "second look" doctrine? Or does the arbitrator apply American antitrust law and render the award subject
to .attack for "manifest disregard" of the law selected by the
parties?
76
IV. CHOICE OF LAW AND IMPERATIVE NATIONAL NORMS

The public interest may be affected by private adjudication
72. A. DENNING, THE DISCIPLE OF THE LAW 74 (1979).
73. See Park, The Lex Loci Arbitri and InternationalCommercial Arbitration, 32
INT'L & Comp. L.Q. 21, 48-51 (1983).
74. See, e.g., Saxis S.S. Co. v. Multifacs Int'l Traders, Inc., 375 F.2d 577 (2d Cir.
1967); Amicizia Societa Navegazione v. Chilean Nitrate & Iodine Sales Corp., 274 F.2d
805 (2d Cir. 1960); Swift Indus., Inc. v. Botany Indus., Inc., 466 F.2d 1125 (3d Cir. 1972).
75. For example, the sale of apples pursuant to a contract containing an arbitration
agreement which vaguely covers disputes arising from the "sale of fruit" may cover oranges as well as apples, but would not cover greeting cards. The harder case might be
walnuts, which like apples, satisfy the botanical definition of fruit (the mature ovary of a
plant) but not the common concept.
76. On choice of law in arbitration of transnational business disputes, see generally,
Lando, The Law Applicable to the Merits of the Dispute, 2 ARB'N INT'L 104 (1986); J.
LEW,
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ARBITRATION,

A STUDY

IN COMMER-
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not only when courts decide whether an issue is arbitrable, but
also when the arbitrator decides what law is applicable. Once the
court has determined that arbitration can proceed, the application of substantive law becomes critical. In areas such as currency controls, trade embargo, boycott, competition and bribery,
mandatory rules may apply to an international relationship irrespective of the law that otherwise governs the relationship. The
imposition of these imperative provisions, or lois de police, depends on whether the arbitrator applies, as to certain issues, a
law other than the one chosen by the parties or selected under
otherwise applicable choice of law rules.
The application of these norms also depends on the attitudes of the court called on to enforce the award. The enforcement forum may refuse to enforce an award even if the issues of
the case are arbitrable. Contemplating such an eventuality led
the court in Mitsubishi to announce what might be called a
"prospective waiver" doctrine.
The majority in Mitsubishi warns that the court would condemn, as against public policy, a choice of forum clause that operates in tandem with a choice of law clause as a "prospective
waiver" of the right to pursue statutory remedies for antitrust
violations." Therefore, it may be assumed, for example, that
United States courts will not enforce an arbitration clause in a
contract to fix prices in Boston with a choice of law clause calling for interpretation of the contract according to a legal system
with no equivalent of an antitrust statute. However, the extent
of application of the "prospective waiver" doctrine is not clear.
Open questions remain. Is an arbitration agreement invalid if
the related choice of law clause refers to a legal system with antitrust laws different from our own? How significant must the
difference be before the "prospective waiver" doctrine applies?
Is the arbitration clause invalid even if the contract has a significant link to the foreign country whose law is chosen?
The "prospective waiver" doctrine echoes existing conflicts
of law principles that already limit party autonomy. Specifically,
the Second Restatement of Conflict of Laws sets forth a principle intended to prevent evasion of mandatory public policy of
the normally applicable law.78
77. 105 S. Ct. at 3359 n.19 (majority opinion). The Court, perhaps naively, assumed

that the arbitrators would apply American antitrust law despite the choice of law clause
designating Swiss law.
78. The Second Restatement on Conflicts sets forth the following principle concern-
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The British perspective is not dissimilar, in that it recog-

nizes that courts will not give effect to a choice of law clause if it
*was chosen to avoid mandatory provisions set forth by the forum
with which the contract had its closest connection. The noted
Oxford and Cambridge don, J.H.C. Morris, states:
[N]o court, it is believed, would give effect to a choice of
law (whether English or foreign) if the parties chose it in order
to avoid the mandatory provisions of the system of law with
which the contract had its closest and most real
connection ....71
Continental scholars have also elaborated a doctrine to deal
with what in French is referred to as fraude & la loi.0 French
doctrine calls for recognition of peremptory rules, lois de police,
of a foreign law otherwise applicable to a transaction."1 However,

it is worthy of note that the leading French expert on the docing attempts to evade mandatory public policy of the normally applicable law:
§ 187. Law of the State Chosen by the Parties
(2) The law of the state chosen by the parties to govern their contractual rights
and duties will be applied, even if the particular issue is one which the parties
could not have resolved by an explicit provision in their agreement directed to
that issue, unless...
(b) application of the law of the chosen state would be contrary to a
fundamental policy of a state which has a materially greater interest than the chosen state in the determination of the particular issue and which, under the rule of § 188, would be the state of the
applicable law in the absence of an effective choice of law by the
parties.
RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187 (1971).
79. J.H.C. MORRIS, CONFLICT OF LAWS 217 (2d ed. 1980) (discussing the Vita Foods
case [1939] 1 A.C. 361, and citing Helbert Wagg & Co. Ltd's Claim [1956] ch. 323, 341).
Furthermore, according to Morris:
[N]o one can maintain that parties who really contract under one law can by
pretending that they are contracting under another law, render valid an agreement which the former law treats as invalid. Hence, the court will not necessarily regard an express choice of law as being the governing consideration where
a system of law is chosen which has no real or substantial connection with the
contract looked upon as a whole. The reason is that the lack of connection may
be evidence of an evasive intent.
Id. at 218. Morris, however, notes that in no reported cases have English courts actually
refused to give effect to express choice of law clauses.
80. See B. AuDrr, LA FRAUDE A LA Loi §§ 495-502 (1974), dealing with "l'application
des lois imperatives du for et la fraude a la loi trangbre." Id. at 389-97.
81. See P. MAYER, DROIT INTERNATIONAL PRivr §§ 122-31, at 102-11 (2d ed. 1983);
Mayer, Les Lois de Police, 108 J. Du DRorr INT'L 277 (1981); Mayer, Mandatory Rules of
Law in InternationalArbitration, 2 ARB. INT'L (1986).
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trine of foreign lois de police has expressed doubt about the legitimacy of application of a nation's competition law extraterritorially, to cover contracts entered into outside national borders
merely because of effects inside the territory.8 2
The Rules of the International Chamber of Commerce provide reason to suspect that arbitrators would not violate the
mandatory public policy norms of the place of contract performance. Article 26 of the I.C.C. Rules expressly calls upon the arbitrator to "make every effort to make sure that the award is enforceable." 83 Commentators have noted the arbitrator's
obligation to protect the reputation of the arbitral process,
which should lead him to refuse to allow arbitration to be used
"to evade the relevant policies of those countries which have an
interest in the subject matter of the dispute .... "
It follows that a party who assented to a choice of the law of
Ruritania would not necessarily be stopped from asserting later
that the law of the United States - the place of performance was the appropriate law to govern resolution of its claims. Respect for parties' choice of forum does not necessarily carry with
it a respect for their choice of law if the latter is intended to
violate mandatory rules of countries with a close connection to
performance of the contract, or imperative norms of "international public policy," as would, for example, contracts to bribe
high government officials.8 5
Within the framework of the New York Convention, public
policy has a less obvious role with respect to scrutiny of the
agreement to arbitrate, than with respect to enforcement of the
award. Article II of the Convention, which requires courts to recognize and enforce arbitration agreements unless "null and
void," says nothing about a "public policy" defense to enforcement of the agreement.8 6 Therefore, it may not be a simple exer82. Mayer, Les Lois de Police, supra note 81, § 48, at 323.
83. International Chamber of Commerce Rules of Conciliation and Arbitration, art.
26, reprinted in I.C.C. ARBrRATiON, supra note 8, app. II, at 12.
84. See Lando, The Lex Mercatoria in International Commercial Arbitration, 34
INT'L & Comp. L.Q. 747, 766-67 (1985).
85. See I.C.C. Award No. 1110, 15 Jan. 1963, discussed in I.C.C. ARBrrATiON, supra
note 8, pt. 2, ch. 5, § 5.07, at 25, in which Swedish Judge Lagergren declined jurisdiction
to arbitrate to bribe an Argentinian official, which he deemed contra bonos mores.

86. Article II
3. The court of a Contracting State, when seized of an action in a matter in

respect of which the parties have made an agreement within the meaning of
this article, shall, at the request of one of the parties, refer the parties to arbi-
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cise to fit into the language of the New York Convention these
principles relating to mandatory public policy norms.
V.

PUBLIC POLICY AT THE PLACE OF THE PROCEEDINGS

A.

Article V(1)(e) of the New York Convention

An award applying the Sherman Act in disregard of the parties' express choice of non-American law - a possibility raised
by footnote 19 of the majority opinion in Mitsubishi - would be
vulnerable to attack under the laws of the place where rendered. 7 If annulled by a court in the place of the proceedings
and subsequently presented for enforcement in a country where
the losing party has assets, such an award would be subject to
challenge under Article V(1)(e) of the New York Convention,
which permits refusal of enforcement of an award set aside in
the country where rendered. The Convention language is permissive, not mandatory, allowing courts to refuse recognition,
but not requiring them to do so.
The national law applicable to the validity of the overall arbitral proceedings is not necessarily the same as the law applicable to the merits of the dispute, or the law that the arbitrator
applies to procedural matters arising internally during the proceedings. An arbitrator sitting in Geneva might interpret a contract according to English law, and apply American rules of evidence. But the challenge of the award in Geneva by the
dissatisfied party would be made according to mandatory provisions of Swiss law. The domestic law of the place where the
5 8
award is made is often referred to as the lex loci arbitri
The award annulled under the law of the place of the proceedings may still be presented for enforcement before a court in
another country where the losing party has attachable assets.
However, that other court would be entitled to refuse recognition and enforcement of the award, even if it came to a different
conclusion about the propriety of annulling the award than did
tration, unless it finds that the said agreement is null and void, inoperative or
incapable of being performed.
New York Convention, supra note 8, at art. II.
87. See supra text accompanying notes 68-71.
88. See Park, supra note 73. For contrasting views of more eminent lawyers on the
subject of the lex loci arbitri,see Craig, InternationalAmbition and NationalRestraint,
reprinted in I.C.C. Arbitration, supra note 8, app. 7, at 19-51; Paulsson, Arbitration
Unbound: Award Detached From the Law of its Country of Origin, 30 INT'L & Comp.
L.Q. 358 (1981).
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the court of the place where the award was made. For example,
the arbitrator's excess of jurisdiction might be apparent to a
judge in Geneva, where the award was rendered, but not to a
judge in New York, where the loser had assets. Yet the judge in
New York might still defer to the Geneva judge and refuse enforcement of the award.
B. Berardi v. Clair
The French case Berardi v. Clair"' presents an example of
the influence of the law of the place of the proceedings. In this
case, there had been arbitration in Switzerland of a dispute concerning the accuracy of the balance sheet of a company whose
shares were sold by a Canadian to a Frenchman. The arbitrator
rendered an award in favor of the Canadian seller against the
French buyer. The Paris Tribunal de grande instance granted
leave to enforce the award in France. Three months later, the
cantonal Cour de justice in Geneva annulled the award as "arbitrary" under Article 36(f) of the Swiss inter-cantonal arbitration
concordat.90 The Paris Cour d'appel then quashed the lower
court decision, refusing recognition in France of an award set
aside under the law of the place where rendered. The French
court apparently believed, perhaps erroneously, that the Convention required refusal.91
A different result would have been obtained had the arbitration been within the scope of the European Convention on International Commercial Arbitration,9 2 often called the Geneva Convention of 1961, to distinguish it from another Geneva
Arbitration Convention signed in 1927. Article 9 of the Geneva
Convention permits refusal of recognition because of foreign annulment only if annulment was for specific enumerated grounds,
89. Judgment of June 20, 1980, Cour d'appel, Paris (unpublished opinion), re-

printed in II INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION: NEW YORK CONVENTION pt. V, §§
111.2-111.6 (G. Gaja ed. 1984) [hereinafter cited as I.CA N.Y. CONVENTION].
90. Judgment of Oct. 31, 1979, Cour de Justice, Geneva (Rpublique et Canton de
Gen~ve) (unpublished).
91. The court said "l'ex6cution d'une sentence arbitrale 'dolt' 6tre refus~e." LC.
N.Y. CONVENTION, supra note 89, at § 111.5. It is important to note the difference between the English and French texts of Article V(1) of the New York Convention. The
former is permissive, not mandatory, and begins, "Recognition and enforcement of the
award may be refused ...... The latter reads, "La reconnaissance et l'ex~cution ne pourront 6tre refus~es... que si. . . ." ("Recognition and enforcement cannot be refused ...
unless. ...")
92. Geneva Convention of 1961, supra note 49.
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such as lack of notice to parties or the invalidity of the agreement.9 3 "Arbitrariness" is not one of these enumerated grounds.
The European Convention applies to agreements and awards
based on contracts between persons residing in states that have
adhered to the Convention. Since Canada was not a party to the
European Convention, its provisions did not apply in Berardi v.
Clair. Had Canada been a party to the European Convention,
the award in Berardi v. Clair should have been enforced in
Paris.
C.

SPP v. Egypt: A Tale of One Day in Two Cities

Recent Dutch and French cases involving an aborted construction project near the Pyramids also illustrates the influence
of the law of the place of arbitration. In Southern Pacific
Properties (Middle East), Ltd. v. Arab Republic of Egypt,9 4 an
award for more than $12 million had been rendered against
Egypt by an arbitral tribunal sitting in France. On the 12th of
July 1984, the award was both annulled by a court in Paris9 5 and
recognized by a court in Amsterdam which did not know of the
French annulment.9 6 One can only speculate as to what the result would have been if the French decision had come a day earlier or the Dutch decision a day later. The Paris annulment led
the parties to agree to stay further proceedings in the Netherlands until disposition of the appeal to the annulment in France.
D.

"Delocalization"

Considerable ink has been spilled by scholars and practitioners on annulment of awards under the law of the place of the
arbitration, and the propriety of another country recognizing
97
such nullification by refusing to enforce the annulled award.
93. Geneva Convention of 1961, supra note 49, at art. XX.
94. See infra notes 95-96.
95. Judgment of July 12, 1984, Cour d'appel, Paris, reprinted in 23 LL.M. 1049-61
(E. Gailard trans. 1984).
96. Judgment of July 12, 1984, District Court, Amsterdam, reprinted in 24 IL.M.
1042-45 (A.J. van den Berg trans. 1985).
97. See Paulsson, Delocalisation of International Commercial Arbitration: When
and Why it Matters, 32 IT'L & Comp. L.Q. 53 (1983); P. FOUCHARD, L'ARBrrAGE COMMERCIAL INTERNATIONAL § 508 (1965); Lalive, Les R~gles de Conflict de Lois Appliquees
au Fond du Litige par L'Arbitre International Siegeant en Suisse, REvUE DE
L'ARBrrRAGE 155 (1976). But see Mann, Lex Facit Arbitrum, in INTERNATION
ABIrrPATIoN: LIER AMICORUM FOR MARTIN DOMKE 157 (P. Sanders ed. 1967); Park, supra note
73.
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For reasons of geographical convenience, the parties may chose
to arbitrate in a city like Geneva, yet not wish to be subject to
mandatory norms of Swiss procedure, such as the availability to
losing parties of a challenge of the award based on its alleged
"arbitrariness." As a result, many practitioners and scholars in
Continental Europe have argued for a "delocalized" arbitration
system in which the award "drifts" free of such restraints of the
national law of the place where it was rendered.9" These lawyers
argue that enforcement should not be denied merely due to annulment in the country of origin.
No national judiciary, however, has ever completely thrown
off the shackles of territoriality by enforcing an award explicitly
annulled where rendered. In theory, this could happen within
the New York Convention framework, and should happen in the
right circumstances under the 1961 European Convention. 9 But
theory has not yet become practice.
As a matter of policy, a defective award annulled in the
country where rendered should be subject to challenge of some
sort, so that the losing party need not necessarily defend against
enforcement everywhere he or it has assets. Few arbitration lawyers would welcome an end to all influence of the lex loci arbitri.
Yet few want its mandates applied as rigorously or extensively
to international arbitration as to domestic arbitration. The best
view seems to be that local courts should annul an award only if
the arbitral process violates minimum international standards of
procedural fairness.10 0 In particular, a company that never
signed the arbitration agreement should have a chance to litigate
that issue at the outset. 10 1 For example, an arbitrator may
render an award against both the subsidiary and the parent corporation in a dispute with respect to which only the subsidiary
signed the arbitration agreement. Local courts of the place of
arbitration would be justified in setting aside such an award as
98. See Park, supra note 73.
99. See supra text accompanying notes 92-93.
100. See, e.g., Art. 1502 of the French Nouveau Code de Procedure Civile
(N.C.P.C.), Decree No. 81-500, May 12, 1981, 1981 D.S.L. 237, 240, 1981 B.L.D. 237, 240,
discussed infra at text accompanying note 114.
101. For a case involving arbitration agreements and related corporate entities, see
Dale Metals Corp. v. Kiwa Chemical, Indus. Co., Ltd., 442 F. Supp. 78 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
On problems related to piercing the corporate veil, see generally, P. BLUMBERG, THE LAW
OF CORPORATE GROUPS: PROCEDURAL PROBLEMS IN THE LAW OF PARENT AND SUBSIDIARY
CORPORATIONS (1983); P. BLUMBERG, THE LAW OF CORPORATE GROUPS: BANKRUPTCY LAW

(1985).

1986]

SCOPE OF INT'L ARBITRATION

to the parent. It would seem unfair that the parent be required
to defend against enforcement of the award in the many countries where it has assets, at least if the parent cannot be held
liable for the debts of the subsidiary on an alter ego or agency
theory.
Many major arbitral centers have fewer grounds for annulment of awards in international, rather than domestic, arbitration. Reforms in England in 1979 and in France in 1981 have
been well-publicized in the competition for the income from "invisible exports" in the form of fees to arbitrators and lawyers.
Yet some degree of control remains. Only Belgium seems to have
relieved its courts completely of the power to review awards in
arbitrations between foreign parties.102
Enforcement of an award annulled in its country of origin
would seem appropriate only where the local judiciary that annulled the award is corrupt, or where the award was set aside for
reasons so peculiar to the local law of the place of the proceedings that non-recognition would defeat the goals of the New
York Convention. For example, it would seem wrong to give effect to an annulment by a judge who was paid by one of the
parties to do so, or to refuse to recognize an award annulled because the local law provided that all arbitrators must sign the
arbitral award. A judge of a forum where the losing party has
assets might enforce such awards although they had been annulled where rendered.
E. IllustrativeNational Legal Systems
Before concluding this section, it may be useful to present a
brief comparison of the legal provisions under which local courts
may annul awards rendered in arbitral proceedings in England,
France, Switzerland or the United States.
1. The United States
A United States District Court may annul an award rendered in the United States under Section 10 of the United
States Arbitration Act which, to the extent not in conflict with
the provisions of the New York Convention, continues to have
residual application. 103 These grounds for annulment permit
102. See Paulsson, Arbitration Unbound in Belgium, 2 ARn. INT'L 68 (1986).
103. Section 10 provides:
In either of the following cases the United States court in and for the dis-
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American courts to control the basic integrity of the arbitral
process in cases where one of the parties feels that the procedure
was not what he, she, or it bargained for in the agreement to
arbitrate. In particular, Section 10(d) permits an order vacating
an award where the arbitrator was in excess of his or her authority. One Supreme Court opinion contains dicta interpreting Subsection 10(d) to include annulment for "manifest disregard of
the law.' 1 0 4 "Manifest disregard" of the law is a concept that is
fuzzy at best. It clearly presupposes "something beyond and different from a mere error of the law or failure on the part of the
arbitrators to understand and apply the law."'1 5 However, few
cases involve an arbitrator ignoring the correct governing law.
Thus "manifest disregard" remains a concept with uncertain
meaning, but which indicates more than a mere mistake in the
trict wherein the award was made may make an order vacating the award upon
the application of any party to the arbitration (a) Where the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue means.
(b) Where there was evident partiality or corruption in the arbitrators, or
either of them.
(c) Where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to postpone the hearing, upon sufficient cause shown, or in refusing to hear evidence
pertinent and material to the controversy; or of any other misbehavior by
which the rights of any party have been prejudiced.
(d) Where the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly executed them that a mutual, final, and definite award upon the subject matter
submitted was not made.
(e) Where an award is vacated and the time within which the agreement
required the award to be made has not expired the court may, in its discretion,
direct a rehearing by the arbitrators.
9 U.S.C. § 10 (1947).
It is unlikely that there would be conflict with the New York Convention if the
award is made in the United States, because it would not be a "foreign" award covered
by the Convention. An award rendered in the United States might conceivably be a
"non-domestic" award, but the judicial elaboration of this concept is too sketchy to permit general conclusions about what awards rendered in the United States will be domestic or non-domestic. See Bergesen v. Joseph Muller Corp., 710 F.2d 928 (2d Cir. 1983).
See supra note 51 and accompanying text (for a discussion of this case).
104. Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. at 436. See supra note 68.
105. Saxis S.S. Co. v. Multifacs Int'l Traders, Inc., 375 F.2d 577, 582 (2d Cir. 1967)
(quoting San Martine Co. de Navigacion v. Saguenay Terminals, Ltd., 293 F.2d 796, 801
(9th Cir. 1961), the court refused to apply the concept of "manifest disregard"). See also
Amicizia Societa Navegazione v. Chilean Nitrate & Iodine Sales Corp., 274 F.2d 805, 808
(2d Cir. 1960) (court refused to apply the "manifest disregard" concept to the facts at
issue). In only one reported case, to my knowledge, did the court actually strike down an
award that did not "draw its essence" from the parties' agreement. See also Swift Indus.,
Inc. v. Botany Indus., Inc., 466 F.2d 1125 (3d Cir. 1972). It is uncertain whether "manifest disregard" has worked its way into the defenses permitted under Article V of the
New York Convention. See Parsons & Whittemore Overseas Co. v. Societe Gen. De
L'Indus. Du Papier (RAKATA), 508 F.2d 969, 977 (2d Cir. 1967).

1986]

SCOPE OF INT'L ARBITRATION

interpretation of the law.
2. England 0'
The 1979 English Arbitration Act 0 7 replaced an old procedure
for appeal of questions of law to the High Court, called the "case
stated" procedure, with a more limited right of appeal for arbitrator error of law.108 With leave of the High Court, appeal may
be taken if the legal question "could substantially affect the
rights of one or more of the parties."1 0 9
In international arbitration it is possible to exclude the
right of appeal by an "exclusion agreement" in the principal
contract itself. In a "non-domestic contract," where at least one
of the parties is not British, parties may agree in writing to preclude the courts from hearing appeals or providing interlocutory
rulings on questions of law. The High Court has held that reference to the I.C.C. Arbitration Rules (of which Article 24 precludes appeal) constitutes the incorporation of a valid "exclusion
agreement."1 10
The 1979 Act did not repeal the High Court's residual statutory power to remit awards for reconsideration by the arbitrator and to set aside an award for arbitrator "misconduct" under
Section 23(1) of the 1950 Act. In judicial decisions rendered
before 1979, the term "misconduct" was interpreted to apply to
"procedural errors and omissions by arbitrators who are doing
their best to uphold the highest standards of their profession."1
Thus there is still the possibility for English courts to remit or
to set aside awards, despite an exclusion agreement.
Recent English case law, however, suggests a trend toward
11 2
judicial respect for the independence of the arbitral process.
106. See generally M. MUSTILL & S. BoYD, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION (1982) (on English arbitration law).
107. Arbitration Act of 1979, cl. 42, reprinted in 49 HALSBURY'S STATUTES OF ENGLAND 59 (R. Mangal & E.Z. Durbin ed., 3d ed. 1980) [hereinafter cited as Arbitration Act
of 1979].
108. See Park, Judicial Supervision of Trans-national Commercial Arbitration:
The English Arbitration Act of 1979, 21 HARVARD INT'L L. J. 87 (1980).
109. Arbitration Act of 1979, supra note 107, at cl. 42, § 1(I)(4).
110. Arab African Energy Corp. v. Olie Produkten Nederland BV, [1983] Com. L.R.
195.
111. See 1978 Commercial Court Committee Report on Arbitration (CMND. 7284),
17, at 17.
112. See the discussion by David Shenton in proceedings of A.B.A. Litigation Section, Atlanta, Aug. 2, 1983, as cited by Margaret Rutherford in 52 ARB. 38, 39-42 (1986),
and by Martin Hunter, ArbitrationProcedure in England, 1 ARB. INT'L 82, 97 (1985).
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Nonetheless, the legal correspondent of the Financial Times has
commented that "No manner of legislation, however, will remove ... the professional zeal of London solicitors and barristers who transplant into arbitration proceedings the habits ac'113
quired in the courts.
3. France
International arbitral awards rendered in France may be set
aside by French courts on the basis of grounds specifically enumerated in a decree issued in May 1981114 that permits annulment to insure observance of minimum standards of honesty
and integrity of proceedings. 1 5 Specifically, the Decree provides
for annulment if there was no valid arbitration agreement or the
arbitrator decided on the basis of a void or expired agreement;
there were the irregularities in the composition of the arbitral
tribunal or in the designation of the sole arbitrator; the arbitrator has decided in a manner incompatible with the mission conferred upon him; due process (literally: the principle of an adversarial process) has not been respected.
Finally, there may be annulment if the award's recognition
or enforcement would be contrary to international public policy,
ordre public international.This last ground for challenge refers
to the public policy of France, rather than a public international
norm. However, the public policy of France imposes itself less
intrusively when the dispute has an international, rather than
domestic, character.
4. Switzerland
A uniform Swiss arbitration law, referred to as the Concordat," 6 has been accepted by all cantons except Lucerne, Glaris,
Argovie and Thurgovie.11 7 Two-thirds of the Concordat's forty113. See Herman, The Financial Times, Oct. 20, 1983, at 38, cols. 5-8.
114. Decree No. 81-500, May 12, 1981, 1981 Recuil Dalloz-Sirey, Legislation [D.S.L.]
237, 1981 Bulletin legislatif Dalloz [B.L.D.] 237.
115. On French arbitration law, see generally J. ROBERT & T. CARBONNEAU, THE
FRENCH LAW OF ARBITRATION

pt. 2, ch. 8 (1983). See Craig, Park, & Paulsson, French

Codification of a Legal Framework for InternationalCommercial Arbitration:The Decree of May 12, 1981, 13 L. & POL. INT'L Bus. 727 (1981).

116. Concordat Suisse sur L 'Arbitrage, reprintedin III INTERNATIONAL
pt. VII, doc. VII.J.1 (1986).

COMMERCIAL

ARBITRATION

117. See P. JOLIDON, COMMENTAIRE DU CONCORDAT
Zurich is the most recent adherent to the Concordat.

SUISSE SUR L'ARBITRAGE

53 (1984).
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six articles are designated as mandatory. The "mandatory" provisions, dispositions imperatives, apply notwithstanding the
parties' desire to tailor the arbitral proceedings otherwise. 118
Some mandatory provisions are merely matters of fairness
or common sense, such as the requirements that the arbitral tribunal be properly constituted, and that the arbitrators respect
the jurisdiction conferred upon them by the parties. One
mandatory provision, however, permits court review of the legal
merits of the arbitrated dispute. Specifically, Article 36(f) gives
judges the power to set aside awards that they consider "arbitrary," defined as constituting a "violation of law or equity" or
based on findings "manifestly contrary to the facts."' 9 Action
for nullification, recours en nullit, is brought before the cantonal court of the seat of the arbitration.
VI. THE NEXT CONFRONTATION: THE BANKRUPTCY CODE
Another confrontation in the area of arbitrability is likely to
involve the Bankruptcy Code 120 which provides for an automatic
stay of actions against companies that have filed for the protection of the bankruptcy court. 121 In Mitsubishi, when the Supreme Court referred Soler to arbitration with respect to its
Sherman Act counterclaims, Soler had already filed a petition
for reorganization under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code. As
a result, the parties went back to court in Puerto Rico, litigating
whether the New York Convention prevails over the Bankruptcy
Code. On April 14, 1986 the District Court removed the reference to the bankruptcy court and ordered arbitration in
1 22
Japan.
The Circuits are divided on whether the Bankruptcy Code
or the Convention prevails as to international arbitration. In at
118. See Neyroud & Park, Predestinationand Swiss ArbitrationLaw: Geneva's Application of the Intercantonal Concordat, 2 B.U. INT'L L.J. 1, 4 (1983); I.C.C. ARBITRATION, supra note 8, pt. 5, ch. 32, § 32.08, at 102 n.178.
119. Art. 36(f) permits annulment "lorsque la sentence est arbitraire parce qu'elle
repose sur des constatations manifestement contraires aux faits ou parce qu'elle constitue une violation 6vidente du droit ou de l'6quit6."
120. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549. Concerning
the interplay between the New York Convention and the Bankruptcy Code, see Westbrook, The Coming Encounter: InternationalArbitrationand Bankruptcy, 67 MINN. L.
REV. 595 (1983).
121. 11 U.S.C. § 362 (1978).
122. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., No. 85-538, slip op.
(D.P.R. Apr. 14, 1986).
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least five cases, courts have either ordered arbitrations to proceed or refused to stay arbitral proceedings, even though one of
the parties had filed under the Bankruptcy Code. 123 In another
case, a bankruptcy court in Texas decided that the Bankruptcy
Code should prevail.1

24

How the Supreme Court ultimately de-

cides the issue may depend on the posture of the case whether or not the bankrupt party is the plaintiff or the defendant, and whether the foreign arbitration has already begun. A
certain dgpeqage -

splitting of issues -

may also be involved.

For example, the question of damages, but not the priority of
claims among creditors, might be held arbitrable.
Domestic cases in which the Bankruptcy Code prevails over
the federal Arbitration Act do not address the concerns and policies of the New York Convention. Therefore, it would not be
surprising to see an evolution of special rules, similar to those
for securities and anti-trust law, applied to the Bankruptcy issues arising from international transactions. If antitrust claims
possessing a "constitutional quality 125 are arbitrable, it would
not be unreasonable to expect a similar principle for claims
against a bankrupt.
VII. JUSTIFYING A DOUBLE STANDARD OF ARBITRABILITY

A.

The Special Needs of InternationalBusiness

In an international context, dramatically disagreeable consequences can result from an unenforceable arbitration agreement. Unenforceability may mean not just litigation in Louisville rather than arbitration in Albany, but perhaps proceedings
in Arabic before a judge in Tripoli or in Jeddah rather than
before an English-speaking arbitrator in Stockholm or Geneva.
Imagine a Libyan enterprise contracting with a New York enterprise under an agreement that provides for arbitration of disputes in Paris under International Chamber of Commerce
123. See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., No. 85-538, slip
op. (D.P.R. Apr. 14, 1986); Quinn v. C.G.R., 48 B.R. 367 (D. Col. 1985); Hart Ski Mfg.
Co. v. Maschinenfabrik Hennecke, 711 F.2d 845 (8th Cir. 1983); Fotochrome, Inc. v. Copal Co., Ltd., 517 F.2d 512 (2d Cir. 1975); Soci6t6 Nationale Alg~rienne Pour La
Recherche, La Protection Le Transport et La Transformation des Hydrocarbures v. Distrigas, No. 86-2014-Y (D. Mass. Mar. 17, 1987).
124. Braniff Airways, Inc. v. United Air Lines, Inc., 33 B.R. 33 (Bankr. N.D. Tex.
1983).
125. See Brodley, Limiting Congolmerate Mergers: The Need for Legislation, 40
OHIO ST. L.J. 867, 867 n.2 (1979).
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(I.C.C.) Rules. Nothing would have stopped the parties from excluding local statutory claims from the scope of the arbitration
agreement, but they decided not to do so. When the contract
became onerous for the Libyan corporation, it asserted a Libyan
"statutory claim" before a Libyan court, which in turn refuses
on public policy grounds to give effect to the agreement to arbitrate. The American company had expected that the dispute be
arbitrated in Paris rather than litigated in Tripoli, as the Libyans had expected arbitration in Paris rather than litigation in
New York. Both sides would be more than distressed to see
these expectations defeated by assertions of statutory
counterclaims.
Parties to international transactions should be able to bargain for an arbitration procedure that reduces the risk of potentially hostile "hometown justice" in the other party's national
courts. If this goal can be defeated by asserting a local statutory
right, then parties to international transactions will be denied
the opportunity to provide with any certainty for a neutral dispute resolution process. The absence of this reasonable certainty
of a neutral forum may impede or distort international trade
and investment, resulting in a less efficient exploitation and allocation of global resources.
Our legal concepts and practice tend to be exported, serving
as examples to foreign courts. If the American business community is not made to honor its arbitration bargains, foreign judges
may refuse to enforce arbitration agreements and awards against
their own nationals, and thus cause American exporters and
multinationals to suffer.
Billions of dollars of international trade and investment beg
for an effective neutral dispute resolution process. Admittedly,
many transactions will be concluded regardless of whether the
parties expect dispute resolution to be neutral. But some may
not. Uncertainty whether the neutral adjudicatory process, bargained for at the outset of a contractual relationship, will indeed
be implemented in the event of a dispute cannot be other than
an obstacle to a cross-border business transaction.
B. Society's Interest in Enforcing the Law
Society's interest in assuring vindication of statutory rights
should not be disregarded lightly. Concern that arbitrators will
be less likely than judges and juries to enforce the law properly
may not be entirely misplaced. The arbitrator is paid to consider
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the interests of the parties. He may also consider public or societal interests affected by the outcome of the dispute, but this is
not the arbitrator's principal job.
Because public law claims can be the object of a private settlement does not necessarily mean they should be capable of resolution by an arbitrator. Settlement occurs after the dispute
arises, and the amount received in settlement presumably would
roughly equal the amount received in litigation, discounted for
reduced legal fees. The parties would evaluate their legal
chances of success in litigation before settling. On the other
hand, because the arbitration clause frequently is included in
the main contract and signed before the dispute arises, this
clause permits little or no informed evaluation of claims, as no
claims have arisen. Furthermore, a pre-dispute agreement may
bargain away rights as yet unknown through waiver of liability
as to unidentified future offenses. As a result, the public interest
in proper enforcement of the law may be frustrated. In at least
two capacities the public may suffer when antitrust laws, for example, are under-enforced: qua consumer (affected by the particular controverted transactions) and, more generally, qua beneficiary of the political liberty and economic efficiency furthered
126
by the free enterprise system.
C. Society's Interest in Efficient Transnational Dispute
Resolution
Assuring vindication of public law claims is not society's
only concern, however. The competing public interest in permitting development of a neutral transnational dispute resolution
system may outweigh the concern for vindication of public law
claims by judges rather than arbitrators. In domestic transactions, the imperative of a neutral forum does not present itself
with the same force as in a transnational context. The public
interest in protection from under-enforcement or misinterpretation of public law issues, which prevails when the transaction is
purely domestic, may be outweighed by the interest in permitting a neutral private adjudicatory process when the transaction
crosses national boundaries. For an American enterprise, the
126. In articulating the community/societal interests affected one must identify assumptions about the free enterprise system and the objectives of the antitrust laws. Do
we want a free market efficiency for economic reasons? Or is our motivation political, to
avoid the untoward consequences of undue concentrations of power and wealth?
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consequences of finding oneself not before an I.C.C. appointed
arbitrator but before Greek, Libyan or French courts, with proceedings in the language not of the playwright Shakespeare, but
perhaps of the playwrights Moliere or Sophocles or of the
prophet Mohammed, are more dramatic than the consequences
of ending up in court in New York rather than in an American
Arbitration Association (AAA) arbitration.
Even if arbitrators do not apply the Sherman Act as well as
judges, a special rule of arbitrability for the international realm
would be justified under a hierarchy of societal policies that take
into account the peculiar need for neutrality in resolution of international contracts disputes. The relative weights one gives to
these competing considerations - proper enforcement of the
law and neutrality of forum - is obviously a matter on which
reasonable folks may differ. Fostering an efficient arbitral process, necessary to freedom to contract for private adjudication,
may be outweighed by the goal of protecting the public against
under-enforcement of public law statutes. However, the protection of the public against under-enforcement may be outweighed
by the goal of increased certainty of neutral dispute resolution
for trans-border business. The assumptions of American Safety
need not be denied; but in a transnational rather than domestic
context, the special need for a neutral forum presents an additional overriding consideration.
A double standard for domestic and for international arbitration presupposes a rigorous triage to separate international
disputes from those disputes that, due to their predominantly
local flavor, ought not to benefit by special treatment. The appropriate test for characterizing transactions as "international"
is open to debate. At least two definitional models present themselves. Under English law, courts look to the nationalities of the
parties in order to characterize an arbitration agreement as domestic or international. 12 7 The less mechanical French model
127. Under English law an international arbitration agreement is defined in the negative as one that is not "domestic." A "domestic" agreement is also defined as an agreement to which neither,
(a) an individual who is a national of, or habitually resident in, any State
other than the United Kingdom, nor
(b) a body corporate which is incorporated in, or whose central management
and control is exercised in, any State other than the United Kingdom,
is a party at the time the arbitration agreement is entered into.
Arbitration Act of 1979, cl. 42, § 3.(I)(7), reprintedin HAILSBURY'S STATUTES OF ENGLAND
59, 63 (R. Mangal & E.Z. Durbin ed., 3d ed. 1980).
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considers an arbitration international if it implicates the interests of international commerce. 128 The more flexible Gallic
model commends itself as an inspiration for the elaboration of
an American method of characterizing disputes as
129
"international.

D. Neutral National Courts
An arbitration agreement, of course, is but one form of forum selection clause. A second option is dispute resolution by a
foreign national court, which may appear less threatening to
public interests than arbitration. A foreign national court, it
might be argued, is more like the domestic court that would otherwise hear the claim. Indeed, its open proceedings are subject
to appellate review and public scrutiny.
Similarities may be superficial, however. Not all national judicial systems are the same. Judges in countries that lack a tradition of judicial independence may be less like American judges
than arbitrators convened under the rules of an institution such
An arbitration agreement is thus non-domestic if at least one of the parties is foreign. The scope of inquiry in England is limited to the parties' residence and nationality,
not to the nature of the commercial relationship or the governing substantive law.
The recent Belgian arbitration law also looks to the nationality of the parties. See
Paulsson, supra note 102, at 68.
See also the Swiss Federal draft revised codification of conflict of law rules, which
would permit waiver of the right to appeal in an arbitration in which neither party is a
Swiss resident. The Swiss draft law is discussed in Neyroud & Park, supra note 118, at
23-26.
128. The French Arbitration Decree of 1981 provides: "Est international l'arbitrage
qui met en cause des int~rits du commerce international." See Art. 1492 of the French
Noveau Code de Procedure Civile, (N.C.P.C.), Decree No. 81-500, May 12, 1981, 1981
[D.S.L.] 237, 240, 1981 [B.L.D.] 237, 240. See generally P. Fouchard, Quand un arbitrage est-il international?,REVUE DE L'ARBITRAGE 59, 71-74 (1970) (on the traditional
French doctrine of international arbitration).
129. The American statute implementing the 1958 New York Convention includes
within its scope commercial relationships between American citizens only if the contract
involves foreign property, requires performance abroad, or has a reasonable relationship
with a foreign country. 9 U.S.C. § 202 (1976).
The New York Convention covers foreign arbitral awards and arbitral awards "not
considered as domestic" under the law of the recognition forum. New York Convention,
supra note 8, at art. I(1). For an American interpretation of what it means for an award
to be "not domestic," see Bergesen v. Joseph Muller Corp. 548 F. Supp. 650 (S.D.N.Y.
1982), af'd, 710 F.2d 928 (2d Cir. 1983). See supra note 51 (for a discussion of
Bergesen).
With respect to arbitration agreements, as contrasted with awards, the Convention
is not explicit as to its scope. See generally A.J. VAN DEN BERG, THE NEW YORK ARBITRATION CONVENTION OF 1958: TOWARDS A UNIFORM JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION § 1-2, at 56-71
(1981) (on the application of the Convention to arbitration agreements).
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as the I.C.C. or the London Court of International Arbitration
(LCIA). An I.C.C. arbitral tribunal may be less subject to inappropriate political pressure, or more sensitive to the legitimate
American public policies, than the national courts of many
countries.
Concern for judges' national predispositions may prevent
the parties from agreeing on a national court to hear their dispute. Industrialized countries may feel uncomfortable before
Third World judges, and developing nationals with or without
Marxist governments may resist reference to capitalist courts of
former colonial powers.1 30

Moreover, the parties may not be certain in advance of a
dispute that a given foreign national court will accept jurisdiction. National attitudes toward forum shopping differ. Some
courts will not accept jurisdiction of disputes between foreign
parties when there is no connection between the dispute and the
forum selection. For example, the New York Business Corporation Law and the New York General Obligation Law limit the
right of a foreign corporation to bring an action against another
foreign corporation, even if both have signed an otherwise valid
submission to the jurisdiction of New York Courts."'1
130. On attitudes of developing countries toward arbitration, see Wilner, Acceptance of Arbitration by Developing Countries, in RESOLVING TRANSNATIONAL DISPUTES
THROUGH INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION (T. Carbonneau ed. 1984).
131. Section 1314 of New York Business Corporation Law in relevant part provides:
(b) Except as otherwise provided in this article, an action or special proceeding
against a foreign corporation [not formed under the laws of the United States
and maintaining an office in New York] may be maintained by another foreign
corporation.., in the following cases only.
(1) Where it is brought to recover damages for the breach of a contract made
or to be performed within this state, or relating to property situated within
this state at the time of the making of the contract.
(2) Where the subject matter of the litigation is situated within this state.
(3) Where the cause of action arose within this state....
(4) Where ... a non-domiciliary would be subject to the personal jurisdiction
of the courts of [New York].
(5) Where the defendant is a foreign corporation doing business or authorized
to do business in the state.
N.Y. Bus. CORP. L. § 1314 (McKinney 1986).
The effect of Section 1314 was modified in 1984 by Section 5-1402 of the N.Y. General Obligation Law:
[A]ny person may maintain an action or proceeding against a foreign corporation, non-resident, or foreign state where the action or proceeding arises out of
or relates to any contract, agreement or undertaking for which a choice of New
York law has been made ... and which (a) is a contract, agreement or undertaking, contingent or otherwise, in consideration of, or relating to any obligation arising out of a transaction covering in the aggregate, not less than one
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Contemplating Alternatives

Assessing the societal interest in arbitration as a viable dispute resolution option depends on the alternatives one may contemplate. Businessmen who regret their decision to arbitrate
when they view the alternative of American courts forget that
they were motivated to agree to arbitration by a vision of foreign
courts. The arbitration agreement is usually drafted into the
principal contract out of concern that it will be too late to avoid
foreign courts after a dispute arises.
The argument for international arbitration is not that it
avoids cost and delay, for the process is usually long and expensive. Rather, the justification is that parties to a dispute that
crosses national boundaries need a non-national mechanism for
resolution of the controversies. A third nation's courts are not
always an option, either because of uncertainty that the courts
will accept jurisdiction of a dispute with no connection to the
forum state, or because the courts of nations which were formerly colonial powers are unacceptable to developing nations,
whose courts in turn are not acceptable to the Western
multinational.
Although arbitration may not be a first choice for dispute
resolution, it frequently imposes itself on a transaction for want
of another alternative for parties that have rejected both nonbinding mediation and national judges. To make the arbitral
system work, both sides must have a reasonable certainty that
the agreement will be enforced. This larger view of the function
of transnational arbitration argues for limiting the opportunities
of American parties to assert local statutory claims or counterclaims in order to avoid the consequences of their commitments.
million dollars, and (b) which contains a provision or provisions whereby such
foreign corporation or non-resident agrees to submit to the jurisdiction of the
courts of this state.
N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. L. § 5-1402 (McKinney Supp. 1987).
Therefore, a French corporation and a British corporation still could not select New
York courts if they wanted application, for example, of Swiss law, or if the dispute was
for $900,000.
Not all national courts take such a restrictive attitude. English courts, for example,
have shown themselves open to adjudication of disputes between foreign parties concerning controversial events occurring abroad. In a dispute arising from a collision between
Dutch and Belgian vessels in Belgian waters, the eminent Lord Denning ruled that the
English Admiralty Court could accept the election of one of the parties to bring an action in rem in England. "You may call this 'forum shopping' if you please," wrote Denning, "but if the forum is England, it is a good place to shop in, both for the quality of
the goods and the speed of the service." The Atlantic Star, 1 Q.B. 364, 382 (C.A. 1973).
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If the American judiciary contributes to an erosion of the
international business community's confidence in the arbitral
process, American corporations will be the losers when the shoe
is on the other foot and foreign courts imitate American practice
to deny enforcement of the bargain for the more neutral forum
afforded by arbitration.
CONCLUSION

The dissent by Justice Stevens in Mitsubishi expresses concern that enforcing commitments to arbitrate may dispatch
American citizens "to a foreign land in search of an uncertain
remedy for the violation of a public right.' 13 2 Paradoxically, an
even more uncertain remedy in a foreign court may be exactly
the fate of American business if arbitration agreements are not
enforced. The alternative to arbitration depicted by Stevens in
the penultimate sentence of his dissent is "consideration of a
fully developed record by a jury instructed by a federal
judge." 3 3 Justice Stevens' view of the alternatives, however,
might be somewhat incomplete. Another alternative is the specter that haunted the businessman when he signed the arbitration agreement: disposition of disputes by a foreign judge in a
foreign language.
Arbitration abroad is rarely as good as hauling the opposing
party before one's own hometown judges, but usually it is better
than appearing before the opposing party's national courts. Requiring American businessmen to honor their agreements to arbitrate international contract disputes is a necessary step in
building a binding neutral dispute resolution system that will
enable Americans to avoid foreign courts.
The majority in Mitsubishi has reached the right result in
holding antitrust claims arbitrable in an international context.
However, its suggestion that courts later examine arbitral
awards to determine whether public law claims were addressed
may be open to question. A "second look" at the arbitral process
might open the door to a merits review that would render the
arbitration little more than a precursor to litigation.
The majority in Mitsubishi limited its decision to international contracts. The limitation, even if desirable does not necessarily follow from Justice Blackman's assumption that arbitra132. 105 S. Ct. 3374 (1985).
133. Id.
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tors as well as judges can enforce public laws. This assumption
would seem to apply equally to domestic arbitration.
The distinction between domestic and international arbitration would seem to flow more logically from a decision based on
the policies underlying the New York Convention, to which nations adhere in the hope of assuring for their nationals the opportunity to contract out of the home-town justice of foreign
courts. A special rule for international disputes makes arbitration available to parties doing business across national boundaries, but not in a purely domestic context. In the latter domestic
context, the need for a neutral forum is not as acute as in international transactions, and non-arbitrability is justified to protect
public interests implicated in the dispute.
In international contract disputes, the need for a neutral forum justifies a departure from standards applied to domestic
transactions.3 4 Domestically nurtured concerns for proper enforcement of public law claims may have to yield to a larger concern that international trade and investment not be frustrated
because of routine refusal to honor commitments to arbitrate international contracts disputes.
In a purely domestic context, an unenforceable arbitration
clause may mean adjudication in Los Angeles rather than in
Boston. As disquieting as the prospect of California justice may
be to a New Englander, an unenforceable arbitration agreement
can give rise to even more apprehension in an international context, where judicial proceedings may be in a foreign language
and in a country where xenophobia or political influence make a
fair trial questionable.
Arbitration is not a summum bonum, however, and it seems
appropriate to give some discretion to the judge called upon to
enforce the agreement to arbitrate. The New York Convention
may be too blunt an instrument, with the result that its signatories take lightly their international commitments. The Convention contains no explicit escape hatch whereby a judge may distinguish a contract between two sophisticated multinationals
from a contract of adhesion imposed on a small local merchant
134. At least one friend of arbitration, the distinguished scholar Professor Thomas
Carbonneau, has expressed a divergent view. Professor Carbonneau, in Mitsubishi: The
Folly of Quixotic Internationalism,2 ARB. INT'L 116 (1986), argues that the Mitsubishi
decision moves international arbitration toward "a realm of 'a-national' lawlessness." Id.
at 136.
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with little bargaining power. 3 5 Indeed, one troubling aspect of
the Mitsubishi case is that Soler was just the type of company in
need of the paternalistic legislation represented by the Automobile Dealer's Day in Court Act. A special, more liberal, rule for
international transactions should be applied only to cases in
which there has been a freely bargained-for waiver of rights.
The raison d'etre for commercial arbitration in transactions
that go beyond our national frontiers is the search for a delocalized dispute resolution in a neutral forum. If American corporations can escape their bargained-for, but inconvenient, arbitration commitments by alleging violations of statutory rights,
foreign corporations will attempt to follow suit. The resulting
lack of confidence in a neutral adjudicatory process will not enhance the role of international trade and investment in the process of global wealth production and distribution. Rather, an ineffective arbitral system may produce a dramatic irony in which
the American businessman is hauled before a foreign judge less
appealing to him than the transnational arbitral tribunal whose
jurisdiction he first accepted but later sought to avoid. Commerical self interest, as well as fairness, argue for requiring Americans to respect commitments made in the world marketplace.

135. Only by reading Convention Article II to imply an escape hatch based on the
law of the forum, as suggested by the First Circuit (see supra text accompanying note
10), can the New York Convention permit the fine tuning needed to accommodate concerns related to protecting weaker parties.
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The Structure of the Mitsubishi Joint

Chrysler Corporation

Mitsubishi Heavy Industries
(Japan)
I

(United States)
\100%

Chrysler Corporation, S.A. [C.I.S.A.]

(Switzerland)
X\50%
(Japan)

/

Soler Chrysler Plymouth [Dealer]
(Puerto Rico)

1 50%

